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Abstract
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Ex-
tending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that
stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substi-
tutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-
domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition,
we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal sta-
ble matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even
though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.
1 Introduction
Externalities are present in many two-sided markets. For instance, couples in a labor market
pool their resources as do partners in legal or consulting partnerships. As a result, the pref-
erences of an agent depend on the contracts signed by the partners. Likewise, a firm’s hiring
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decisions are affected by how candidates compare to competitors’ employees. Finally, be-
cause of technological requirements of interoperability, an agent’s purchase decisions depend
on other agents’ decisions.1
In this paper, we incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of Gale and Shap-
ley (1962).2 We refer to the two sides of the market as buyers and sellers. Each buyer-seller
pair can sign many bilateral contracts. Furthermore, each agent is endowed with a choice
function that selects a subset of contracts from any given set conditional on a reference set for
the other agents. We build a theory of matching with externalities that both establishes new
insights and extends to the settings with externalities some of the key insights of the classi-
cal theory without externalities, such as the existence of stable matchings and the role of the
deferred acceptance (or cumulative offer) algorithm.3
Our theory is built on a substitutes condition that extends the classical substitutes condition
to the setting with externalities. Our condition requires that each agent rejects more contracts
from any set than its subsets conditional on the same reference set (as in the classical sub-
stitutes condition) and also that each agent rejects more contracts from a set 𝑋 conditional
on a reference set ` than set 𝑋 conditional on a reference set `′ such that ` reflects better
market conditions than `′ for her side of the market. The idea of better market condition ex-
tends the revealed preference idea of Blair (1988) to the setting with externalities. When there
are no externalities, this substitutes condition reduces to the classical gross substitutes condi-
tion of Kelso and Crawford (1982). Our condition is satisfied by standard choice functions of
households consisting of a primary and a secondary earner who pool resources; the pooling of
resources implies that the choice function of a secondary earner depends on the income of the
primary earner and hence exhibits externalities (see Section 3).
We first construct a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm that performs well despite
the presence of externalities. This algorithm—which may be interpreted as a new ascending
auction—may be useful in potential market-design applications. Because an agent’s choice de-
pends on others’ contracts, our algorithm keeps track not only of which contracts are available
1These markets are discussed in more detail in Section 3 and Appendix F.
2Even though we derive our results in a general many-to-many matching setting with contracts (cf. Hatfield
and Milgrom, 2005, Klaus and Walzl, 2009, and Hatfield and Kominers, 2017), the results are new in all special
instances of our setting, including many-to-one and one-to-one matching problems.
3We focus on the classical short-sighted stability concept in which each agent assumes that other agents do not
react to their choice. Our results, however, are applicable to many other stability concepts including far-sighted
ones because we formulate the results in terms of agents’ choice behavior and not in terms of their preferences.
See Remark 1 of the previous version of our paper, which is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2475468.
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but also of the reference sets that agents on each side use to condition their choice. The con-
struction requires care because after the reference set changes an agent may want to go back to
a contract that is already rejected. To ensure that this does not happen, we construct the initial
reference sets in a preliminary phase of the algorithm. Relatedly, we cannot stop the algorithm
as soon as the sets of available contracts converge: we need to continue until the reference sets
converge as well. Our construction of initial reference sets ensures that subsequent reference
sets change in a monotonic way with respect to the better market conditions preorder, thus en-
suring that from some point on the reference sets belong to the same equivalence class. While
these equivalence classes might consist of many matchings, we further show that the algorithm
converges to one of them and never cycles among the members of the same equivalence class.
Our main results show that there exists a stable matching when choice functions satisfy
substitutability (Theorem 1) because the algorithm converges to one and that substitutability is
necessary for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense (Theorem 2) ex-
tending the insights of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), and Hatfield
and Kominers (2017) for the standard substitutability condition in settings without externali-
ties.
In addition to the main results, we show that every stable matching is Pareto efficient (The-
orem 3) and an optimal stable matching exists for side \ under the additional assumption that
there exists a matching that reflects better market conditions than any other matching that can
be chosen for side \ (Theorem 4). This additional assumption is satisfied trivially in settings
without externalities, where the existence of side-optimal stable matchings was established by
Gale and Shapley (1962) for the marriage problem. Furthermore, we provide a characteriza-
tion of substitutable choice functions (Theorem 5): a choice function satisfies the substitutes
condition if, and only if, the choice from a set consists of the highest ranked contracts accord-
ing to some ranking, where the set of allowed rankings is fixed for the choice function. This
characterization is inspired by the decomposition result of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981)
for the setting without externalities.4
We also generalize the rural hospitals theorem (McVitie and Wilson, 1970; Roth, 1984;
Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005), which states that each agent gets the same number of contracts in
every stable matching in a many-to-one matching problem without externalities (in Appendix
A). Our generalization allows different contracts to have different weights that may depend
on the quantity, price, or quality of the contracts. For this purpose, we introduce a general
4For applications of such a decomposition result in settings without externalities see Chambers and Yenmez
(2017).
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law of aggregate demand. An agent’s choice function satisfies the law of aggregate demand if
the weight of contracts chosen from a set conditional on a reference set ` is greater than the
weight of contracts chosen from a subset conditional on a reference set that has worse market
conditions than `. When there are no externalities, this law of aggregate demand reduces to the
monotonicity condition of Fleiner (2003). We show that when choice functions satisfy the law
of aggregate demand in addition to the aforementioned properties, all stable matchings have
the same weight for every agent (Theorem 6).
Many of our results have no forerunners in the literature analyzing externalities in match-
ing. These results include, to the best of our knowledge, our development of the substitutability
condition (and its characterization) as well as our results on efficiency and side-optimal stable
matchings.
The prior matching literature studying externalities focused on the question of existence of
stable matchings and algorithms that can find them.5 The subliterature analyzing the existence
and nonexistence results largely builds on the seminal paper by Sasaki and Toda (1996), who
showed that stable one-to-one matchings need not exist in the presence of externalities. They
also proposed a weak stability concept that allows a pair of agents to block a matching only if
they benefit from the block under all possible rematches of the remaining agents and showed
that such weak stable matchings exist in one-to-one environments. Much of the subsequent
literature—e.g., Chowdhury (2004); Hafalir (2008); Eriksson, Jansson and Vetander (2011);
Chen (2013); Gudmundsson and Habis (2017); Salgado-Torres (2011a,b); Bodine-Baron et al.
(2011)—maintained the focus on the existence question and proposed a variety of weak sta-
bility concepts that modify Sasaki and Toda’s by varying the degree to which the rematches of
other agents penalize the blocking pair. In contrast, our paper uses the standard stability con-
cept of Gale and Shapley (1962) and the literature on matching without externalities.6 We also
contribute conceptually to this earlier literature by pointing out that agents’ choice behavior—
which in contrast to this literature we take to be a primitive of our modeling—synthesizes both
agents’ preferences and assumptions on other agents’ reactions to a block.7
Our contribution on the existence question is closest to the few papers that look at standard
stability in selected matching problems with externalities. Bando (2012; 2014) studies many-
5Bando, Kawasaki and Muto (2016) provide a recent survey.
6In this standard stability concept, a set of agents forms a blocking coalition if it benefits them in the absence
of any reaction from the remaining agents. Note that even in the absence of externalities, one might entertain alter-
native solution concepts in which an agent might be unwilling to enter a blocking coalition if they are concerned
that doing so will trigger a chain of events that will lead them to losing a partner they block with.
7See Footnote 3.
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to-one matching allowing externalities in the choice behavior of firms (agents who match with
potentially many agents on the other side) but not of workers; he further assumes that each
firm’s choice function depends on the matching of other firms only through the set of workers
hired by other firms, and imposes several other assumptions on firms’ choice behavior. Un-
der these assumptions, he proves the existence of stable matchings and analyzes the deferred
acceptance algorithm. In his setting there is no need to keep track of the reference sets in the
deferred acceptance algorithm (and hence no need for the preliminary phase that constructs the
initial reference sets), and his algorithm terminates as soon as there are no rejections. Our sub-
stitutes condition does not imply Bando’s assumptions nor is implied by them. An advantage of
our approach is that it is equally valid in one-to-one, many-to-one, and many-to-many match-
ing settings, while Bando’s conditions do not guarantee the existence of stable many-to-many
matchings even when there are externalities only on one side of the market.8
Other analyses of the existence of matchings that are stable in the standard sense in settings
with externalities focused on externalities within couples (Dutta and Massó, 1997; Klaus and
Klijn, 2005; Kojima, Pathak and Roth, 2013; Ashlagi, Braverman and Hassidim, 2014) and on
complementarities and peer effects among students matched to the same college or workers
matched to the same firm (Dutta and Massó, 1997; Echenique and Yenmez, 2007; Pycia, 2012;
Hatfield and Kominers, 2015).9 not restricting our attention to either of these two types of
externalities, we contribute to both of these subliteratures. Our model of couples in local labor
markets—which is an example of our general framework—is complementary to these earlier
analysis of externalities among couples; the externality of focus in these earlier analyses is that
the members of the couple ending up with jobs that are far away rather than on the issue that a
better job for one member of the couple might enable the other member to be more selective. In
contrast, we focus on the latter issue. Our model of benchmarking in hiring—another example
of our general framework—is complementary to the earlier analyses of complementarities; the
key externality of focus in these earlier papers is one of production complementarities among
agents matched with the same college or firm rather than on the issue of externalities across
colleges or firms, such as those caused by benchmarking. We focus on the latter issue in our
application of our general model to hiring.
Another important difference with the aforementioned papers is that they focused on suf-
8In Example 1, our substitutes condition is satisfied, Bando’s assumptions are not, and a stable matching
exists. In Example 2, our substitutes condition is not satisfied, Bando’s assumptions are satisfied, and a stable
matching does not exist.
9Ostrovsky (2008) studies complementarities in a supply chain network. Sun and Yang (2006) study comple-
mentarities in an exchange economy.
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ficient conditions for existence, except for Pycia (2012) who also—like us—provided a corre-
sponding necessity result. Within the confines of the college admission setting he studies, he
showed that his preference alignment condition is not only sufficient but also necessary in a
maximal-domain sense. Pycia’s alignment condition is neither implied by nor implies standard
substitutability as discussed in his paper; for the same reasons, his condition is neither implied
by nor implies our condition.10
The second focus area of the previous literature that allowed externalities is algorithms that
lead to stable matchings (Echenique and Yenmez, 2007; Pycia, 2012; İnal, 2015). These studies
of the algorithmic question restricted attention to settings in which the complementarities and
peer effects are only among market participants matched to the same agent on the other side of
the market. The deferred acceptance algorithm we proposed is not restricted in this way.11
Our work is also related to the exploration of efficiency in markets with externalities (cf.
Pigou (1932); Ashlagi and Shi (2014); Watson (2014); Chade and Eeckhout (2019)); while
this literature focuses on efficiency, we focus on stability.12 Another part of broader context is
the literature on one-sided allocation that allows for substitutes and complementarities among
assigned goods but usually assumes the absence of externalities across agents; cf. Budish
(2011), Budish and Cantillon (2012), and Miralles and Pycia (2020). The main exception
is Baccara et al. (2012), who analyze stable one-sided allocations and, in addition to an in-
depth empirical analysis of office allocation at a university, they prove that stable one-sided
allocations exist in the presence of externalities provided these externalities have no impact on
agents’ choice behavior; in contrast we allow externalities that may affect behavior.1314
10In particular, his alignment condition fails in general in models with transfers because the receiver of the
transfer prefers a higher payment while the sender prefers a lower payment (cf. Pycia, 2008). Mumcu and
Saglam (2010) extend the alignment approach to analyze when all matchings in the non-empty collection of top
matchings are stable and Teytelboym (2012) extends this approach to externalities among agents in a component
of a network and shows that Pycia’s alignment condition is then sufficient for the existence of a stable matching.
11On the other hand, our algorithm cannot substitute for the earlier proposals in their applicability settings.
For instance, in the environment they study, Echenique and Yenmez (2007) constructed an algorithm that finds a
stable matching whenever stable matchings exist.
12See also Uetake and Watanabe (2012) who provide an empirical analysis of firm mergers using a matching
model with externalities.
13Hong and Park (2018) also study externalities that have no impact on agents’ behavior in the context of
house allocation; they assume that agents’ preferences over objects do not exhibit externalities but allow agents
to have lexicographically second order preferences over economy-wide assignments. Since mechanisms based
on the top trading cycles algorithm are non-bossy, these second-order preferences have no impact on agents’
behavior. Frys and Heller (2016) assume that agents are partitioned into groups of friends—any two friends have
identical preferences and care about each other assignments, there are no externalities across friends—and study
mechanisms based on the random serial dictatorship.
14As we consider an application of our results to the analysis of dynamic matching in Appendix F, let us observe
that prior analyses of dynamic matching—e.g., Ünver (2010), Kurino (2014), and Kotowski (2015)—focused on
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2 Model
There is a finite set of agents I partitioned into buyers, B, and sellers, S, B∪S =I. The set of
agents on the same side with agent 𝑖 is denoted as \ (𝑖). Therefore, \ (𝑖) = B if 𝑖 is a buyer and
\ (𝑖) = S if 𝑖 is a seller. With a slight abuse of notation, \ also denotes one side of the market,
so \ ∈ {B,S}. If \ is a side, then −\ is the other side, that is, −B ≡ S and −S ≡ B. Agents
interact with each other bilaterally through contracts. Each contract 𝑥 specifies a buyer 𝑏 (𝑥), a
seller 𝑠 (𝑥), and terms, which may specify price, quantity, and quality. There exists a finite set
of contracts X. For any 𝑋 ⊆ X, 𝑋𝑖 denotes the set of contracts in 𝑋 involving agent 𝑖, that is
𝑋𝑖 ≡ {𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 : 𝑖 ∈ {𝑏(𝑥), 𝑠(𝑥)}}. Similarly, 𝑋−𝑖 denotes the set of contracts not involving agent
𝑖, that is, 𝑋−𝑖 ≡ 𝑋 \ 𝑋𝑖.
Each agent 𝑖 has a choice function 𝑐𝑖, where 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) is the set of contracts that 𝑖 chooses
from a set 𝑋𝑖 conditional on a reference set `−𝑖, which is the set of contracts signed by the
other agents on the same side.15 The presence of externalities means that agents’ choices are
conditional on the state of the market, and to allow the conditioning, the state of the market
should be observable by the agents. A natural observable is the matching that prevails on the
market; and hence we condition the choices on the reference matching.
We expand the domain of the choice function so that 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖). Choice function
𝑐𝑖 has externalities if there exist 𝑋, `, `′ ⊆ X such that 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) ≠ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′); otherwise, the
choice function exhibits no externalities. Let 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋 |`) ≡ 𝑋𝑖 \ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) be the set of contracts
rejected by agent 𝑖 from 𝑋 conditional on a reference set `. Similarly, define 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) ≡
∪𝑖∈\𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) to be the set of chosen contracts and 𝑅\ (𝑋 |`) ≡ ∪𝑖∈\𝑟𝑖 (𝑋 |`) to be the set of
rejected contracts from set 𝑋 by side \ conditional on a reference set `. Note that for any
𝑋, ` ⊆ X and side \, 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) and 𝑅\ (𝑋 |`) form a partition of 𝑋 since every contract involves
exactly one agent from each side of the market and is either accepted or rejected by the agent.
A matching problem is a tuple (B,S,X,𝐶B ,𝐶S).
We use the term matching to refer to any set of contracts. We embed any quota constraints,
if they exist, in agents’ choice behavior. For instance, we model one-to-one matching markets
by assuming that each agent chooses at most one contract from any set of contracts. Thus,
examples of our setting include standard one-to-one and many-to-one matching problems with
and without transfers.16
environments without externalities; an exception is Pycia (2012), discussed above.
15We could allow choice functions 𝑐𝑖 to depend not only on 𝑋𝑖 and `−𝑖 but also on `𝑖 (that is the set of contracts
signed by 𝑖) with no change in our proofs. A sole exception is the comment provided in Footnote 20.
16Without affecting any of the results, we could alternatively model one-to-one matching and other matching
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A matching ` is individually rational for agent 𝑖 if 𝑐𝑖 (`𝑖 |`−𝑖) = `𝑖. Less formally, con-
ditional on the contracts of other agents on the same side, agent 𝑖 wants to keep all of their
contracts. A buyer 𝑖 and seller 𝑗 form a blocking pair for matching ` if there exists a contract
𝑥 ∈ X𝑖 ∩X𝑗 such that 𝑥 ∉ ` and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (`∪ {𝑥} |`) ∩ 𝑐 𝑗 (`∪ {𝑥} |`). In words, a pair can block
a matching ` if they both would like to sign a new contract conditional on `. Matching ` is
stable if it is individually rational for all agents and there are no blocking pairs. This stabil-
ity concept is identical to pairwise stability studied in settings without externalities (Gale and
Shapley, 1962). As in the standard settings without externalities, stability defined in terms of
individual and pairwise blocking is equivalent to group stability when choice rules are substi-
tutable; see Appendix B.
2.1 Properties of Choice Functions
To guarantee the existence of stable matchings, we impose more structure on the choice func-
tions. First, we generalize two standard assumptions studied in the matching literature without
externalities to our setting. Then, we introduce a new assumption, which is trivially satisfied
when there are no externalities.
The first assumption is a basic rationality axiom we assume throughout the paper.




⊆ X𝑖 and `−𝑖 ⊆ X−𝑖, we have
𝑐𝑖 (𝑋′𝑖 |`−𝑖) ⊆ 𝑋𝑖 ⊆ 𝑋′𝑖 =⇒ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋′𝑖 |`−𝑖).
If choice function 𝑐𝑖 satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts, then excluding contracts
that are not chosen does not change the chosen set.17 This is a basic property of choice func-
tions. It is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preference in settings without externalities
(Alva, 2018). The irrelevance of rejected contracts has been recognized as an important prop-
erty in the choice-function approach to matching by, e.g., Blair (1988) and Aygün and Sönmez
(2013), who restricted attention to the case without externalities. The irrelevance of rejected
contracts is satisfied in all our examples.
environments with quota constraints by assuming that only some sets of contracts are feasible matchings. This
alternative route is straightforward if agents condition their choice behavior on any sets of contracts rather than on
feasible matchings. As is usual in models of matching with contracts, in applications with transfers, we assume
that there is a lowest monetary unit.
17All our assumptions on individual choice functions can equivalently be stated in terms of the side choice
functions.
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The second assumption rules out complementarities between contracts of an agent.
Definition 2. Choice function 𝑐𝑖 satisfies standard substitutability if for all 𝑋𝑖, 𝑋′𝑖 ⊆ X𝑖 and
`−𝑖 ⊆ X−𝑖,




⊇ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) .
A choice function satisfies standard substitutability if the corresponding rejection function
is monotone for a fixed reference set, or equivalently, a contract that is chosen from a set is also
chosen from any subset including that contract conditional on the same reference set. When
there are no externalities, the choice behavior does not depend on the reference set and this
assumption reduces to the condition introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) for a matching
market with transfers.18
Our third assumption captures the idea that not only a single agent’s contracts are substi-
tutable but also a similar substitutability of contracts obtains across agents on the same side
of the market. Roughly speaking, the intuition is that when all agents on one side of the mar-
ket choose from larger sets, then each agent on this side rejects more contracts. We capture
this intuition by imposing monotonicity of rejections in terms of a ranking on the reference
matching.
To formalize the third assumption, we need the following definitions. A binary relation
%𝑖 on a domain A𝑖 ⊆ 2X𝑖 is a set of ordered pairs of matchings in A𝑖; it is reflexive if for any
`𝑖 ∈ A𝑖, `𝑖 %𝑖 `𝑖; it is transitive if `1𝑖 %𝑖 `2𝑖 and `2𝑖 %𝑖 `3𝑖 imply `1𝑖 %𝑖 `3𝑖 . A preorder is a
reflexive and transitive binary relation. We restrict our attention to preorders %𝑖 that have the
empty set in their domain, so ∅ ∈ A𝑖.19 Given a preorder %𝑖 on a domain A𝑖 ⊆ 2X𝑖 for each
agent 𝑖 on side \, we define the corresponding preorder %\ for side \ on domain A = {` ⊆ X :
`𝑖 ∈ A𝑖} ⊆ 2X as follows: for every `, `′ ∈ A,
`′ %\ ` ⇐⇒ `′𝑖 %𝑖 `𝑖 ∀𝑖 ∈ \.
In line with our motivation, when `′ %\ ` we say that `′ reflects better market conditions
than ` for side \. Using preorders of individual agents, a similar preorder %\
′
can be defined
for any set of agents \′ ⊆ \.
An example of a preorder is the revealed-preference order, defined for the case when
18See also Roth (1984), Fleiner (2003), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). The substitutes condition is behind
the monotonicity properties of the deferred acceptance algorithm when there are no externalities, and in this way
underpins the standard matching analysis.
19Instead of preorders we can also work with a transitive binary relation satisfying ∅ %𝑖 ∅.
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choice functions do not have externalities: `′
𝑖
%𝑖 `𝑖 if, and only if, 𝑐𝑖 (`′𝑖 ∪ `𝑖) = `′𝑖 . In the
matching context this revealed-preference order was introduced by Blair (1988), and hence it is
sometimes called Blair order (Echenique and Oviedo, 2006). In general, not all matchings can
be compared using the revealed-preference order and the comparison is reflexive only on the
set of the fixed points of the choice function, {`𝑖 ⊆ X𝑖 : 𝑐𝑖 (`𝑖) = `𝑖}. Likewise, in our general
case, if a matching `𝑖 is not in the domain A𝑖 ⊆ 2X𝑖 of the better market condition preorder,
we cannot compare it to any other matching. While in Blair’s setting the revealed-preference
order is a partial order, that is an antisymmetric preorder, where antisymmetry means that no
two distinct matchings can be related in both directions, our analysis requires us to use the more
general concept of a preorder because antisymmetry might fail in the presence of externalities
(cf. Example 1). In particular, an agent’s choice from a given set of contracts may depend on
the reference matching when there are externalities and as a result the better market condition
may change depending on the reference set.
As in the Blair order, we only need to compare matchings that can be chosen. When
the choice is conditional on the same reference matching, we need to be able to compare the
matching chosen from a set 𝑋 with any matching chosen from a subset of 𝑋 . When the choice is
conditional on different reference matchings, we need to be able to make comparisons implied
by the following consistency assumption. A preorder %\ for side \ is consistent with the side
choice function 𝐶\ if, for any 𝑖 ∈ \ and 𝑋, 𝑋′, `, `′ ⊆ X,




%𝑖 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) .
Thus, if an agent chooses from a larger set and if the other agents have a better market con-
dition, then the agent also has a better market condition. As in the revealed-preference order,
when there are more alternatives to choose from the choice made reflects a better market con-
dition than the choice made from fewer alternatives when the choice is conditional on the same
reference matching. In addition, the same comparison holds when the choice from the superset
is conditional on a reference matching that has a better market condition than the reference
matching of the choice from the subset.
For every side choice function, there exists a preorder that is consistent. For example, the
preorder that compares every pair of matchings is consistent. For the rest of the paper, we fix
an arbitrary consistent preorder %\ unless otherwise stated.
We are now ready to state our third, and main, assumption.
Definition 3. Choice function 𝐶\ satisfies monotone externalities if for all 𝑖 ∈ \, 𝑋𝑖 ⊆ X𝑖, and
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`−𝑖, `′−𝑖 ⊆ X−𝑖,
`′−𝑖 %
\\{𝑖} `−𝑖 %
\\{𝑖} ∅ =⇒ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`′−𝑖) ⊇ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖).
In words, the choice function of a side satisfies monotone externalities if every agent on
this side rejects more contracts when others have a better market condition.20 The intuition
of when this property is satisfied depends on the context. It may be satisfied in settings when
agents pool their resources (see Application 4 in Appendix F). For example, when couples
share income, a married person may be more selective in accepting an offer as their partner gets
a higher-paying job (see Section 3). Monotone externalities may also be satisfied because of
competition. A consulting firm may be more likely to reject a candidate based on the prestige
of their alma mater when the competing firms have consultants who are graduates of more
prestigious schools (see Application 2 in Appendix F).
While monotone externalities is a novel property, it is importantly always satisfied when
there are no externalities for side \ because, in that case, the rejection function does not depend
on the reference set. Thus, the setting with externalities that we study contains the standard
substitutable setting when there are no externalities as a special case.
The conjunction of standard substitutability and monotone externalities is equivalent to the
following property.
Definition 4. Choice function 𝐶\ satisfies substitutability if for all 𝑖 ∈ \, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑋′𝑖 ⊆ X𝑖, and
`−𝑖, `′−𝑖 ⊆ X−𝑖,




⊇ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) .
We refer to this joint condition simply as substitutability because of the parallelism of the
monotonicity ideas captured by its two components: standard substitutability captures mono-
tonicity of rejection function with respect to an agent’s own choice set, while monotone exter-
nalities proxies for such monotonicity with respect to other agents’ choice sets. While weaker
than the conjunction of standard substitutability and no externalities, our substitutability as-
sumption excludes complementarities. In Section 6, we address the question of which choice
20We extend the definitions of consistency and monotone externalities to any 𝐶 \
′
where \ ′ ⊆ \ by restricting the
set of contracts to those associated only with agents in \ ′. For any \ ′ ⊆ \, if 𝐶 \ satisfies monotone externalities
so does 𝐶 \
′
. In addition, if \ ′ has only one agent, say 𝑖, then 𝐶 \
′
satisfies monotone externalities even if 𝐶 \ does
not. The reason is our assumption that an agent 𝑖’s choice conditional on a reference matching ` is the same as
the choice conditional on `−𝑖 . This is the only place in the paper that depends on this assumption (cf. Footnote
15).
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functions are allowed by providing a characterization of substitutable choice functions in terms
of maximizing a set of complete preference orderings.
Let us finish this section with a remark on minimality of a consistent preorder defined
as follows: a preorder %\ is minimal if for every consistent preorder %̃\ , for any `, `′ ⊆ X,
` %\ `′ =⇒ ` %̃\ `′. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the minimal preorder in
Lemma 4 in Appendix D.21 Note that whenever substitutability (or monotone externalities) is
satisfied for a consistent preorder, then it is also satisfied for the minimal consistent preorder
%\ . The reason is that the minimal preorder %\ compares fewer pairs of reference sets, so
substitutability (or monotone externalities) is weaker for the minimal preorder compared to
any other consistent preorder.
3 An Application: Couples in a Local Labor Market
In this section, we discuss couples’ (or households’) labor provision in a local market.22 Work-
ers play the role of, say, sellers of their labor, and sign contracts with employers, who play the
role of buyers. Workers are either single or members of exogenously married couples. As
we focus on externalities within couples, we assume that there are no externalities for single
workers.
Each worker prefers a higher paying job to a lower paying job. Furthermore, each worker
has a reservation wage, which is the lowest wage at which a worker is indifferent between
accepting a job at this wage and staying unemployed. For single workers, reservation wages are
fixed and do not depend on market conditions. However, for married workers reservation wages
depend on the incomes of their partner as follows. Within each couple we distinguish between a
primary earner and a secondary earner: the labor market participation of the secondary earner
depends on the wage of the primary earner.23 When the primary earner receives a higher
wage, the secondary earner becomes more selective. More precisely, the reservation wage of
the secondary earner goes up when the primary earner has a higher income. There are no
21Because in every preorder ∅ %\ ∅, the minimal preorder is non-empty. Furthermore, consistency implies that
even the minimal preorders relate some pairs of distinct matchings provided at least one agent 𝑖 has at least one
contract 𝑥 ∈ X𝑖 such that 𝑐𝑖 ({𝑥} |∅) = {𝑥}.
22We are grateful to Michael Ostrovsky for suggesting this application. Additional motivating applications—
including relative rankings, dynamic matching, profit sharing, and add-ons—are provided in Appendix F. More
abstract illustrative examples are provided in Section 4.1.
23In this section, we maintain the assumption that the roles of primary earners and secondary earners are fixed
and do not depend on market conditions. This assumption is empirically motivated; see the empirical labor market
discussion below. We relax this assumption in Appendix E.
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externalities for primary earners, so their reservation wages are fixed and do not depend on the
income of their partners.
This kind of externality arises in labor markets where members of a couple pool their in-
comes. For instance, suppose that any secondary earner’s job imposes labor-provision disutility
𝑐 and that the secondary earner is willing to accept the job if any only if it pays wage 𝑤 such
that 𝑈 (𝑤 +𝑤𝑝) − 𝑐 ≥𝑈 (𝑤𝑝), where 𝑤𝑝 is the wage of the primary earner and 𝑈 is the concave
utility function of income for the couple.24 In these examples only the wage earned by the
primary earner impacts the choice behavior of the secondary earner and the relative locations
of the two jobs can be ignored; this is in line with our restriction to local labor markets.
To check substitutability, we define the preorder %𝑖 for primary earner 𝑖 of a couple so
that `′
𝑖
%𝑖 `𝑖 when the wage specified in contract `′𝑖 is weakly higher than the wage speci-
fied in contract `𝑖. For any other worker 𝑖, let %𝑖 be the trivial preorder for which every pair
of contracts is comparable.25 The better market preorder for workers is consistent with the
choice behavior because primary earners choose the contract with the highest wage from any
set of contracts; the choice functions satisfy standard substitutability because workers have
unit demand; their choice functions satisfy monotone externalities (and hence substitutabil-
ity) because a secondary earner becomes weakly more selective whenever their partner gets a
higher-paying job.
Supposing that employers’ choice functions also satisfy substitutability—e.g. because their
choice behavior does not exhibit externalities and satisfies standard substitutability—the gen-
eral theory we develop in subsequent sections implies that a stable job matching exists and
is Pareto efficient. The theory also implies that all employers prefer the stable job matching
before some set of workers marry to a stable matching following the marriages, while all pri-
mary earners prefer a job matching post marriages to the one before; an analogous comparative
statics is also valid for divorces.26
24The utility of income may represent the outcome of intra-household bargaining, as in, e.g., Manser and
Brown (1980). The main driver of labor provision costs is hours worked, and the assumption that 𝑐 is fixed means
that different jobs considered by the secondary earner are equivalent in terms of hours worked. Thus the above
example is a good approximation of labor markets in which the vast majority of jobs are full-time, as is true,
e.g., in Eastern Europe and Russia. For instance, in Bulgaria, the country-wide proportion of full-time jobs was
98.4% in 2019, the most recent year with available OECD data. At the other extreme is, e.g., Switzerland, with
only 73.1% of full time jobs. Other than Russia, large economies are in between these two extremes, e.g., the
proportion of full-time jobs in the US was 87.6%. The data is available at https://data.oecd.org/emp/part-time-
employment-rate.htm.
25It is easy to see that these binary relations are preorders.
26For existence, see Theorem 1 in Section 4; for efficiency, see Theorem 3 in Section 5; for comparative statics,
see Theorem 8 in Appendix G. Note that we can analyze two sides of a market separately because we impose no
assumptions relating the choice behavior of agents across sides.
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The presence of income-driven externalities within couples has been studied since Becker
(1973) and is well documented. The rich literature on the so-called added worker effect (e.g.
Lundberg (1985), Chiappori (1992), and Cullen and Gruber (2000)) finds that married women
are more likely to take or search for paid employment when their husbands are unemployed.
Studies based on more recent data—e.g. Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2009)—relax the dis-
tinction between men and women and, instead, like us, analyze couples composed of a pri-
mary earner who always participates in the labor market and a secondary earner who chooses
whether to work or not.27
Finally, note that our restriction to local labor markets plays an important role in the above
analysis by decoupling couple’s or household’s labor provision choices from their decision
where to live. This assumption is generally satisfied in labor markets in which members of the
working class (also called the middle class) and the poor participate: Their costs of moving
or accepting distant jobs are high relative to potential benefits as have been well documented
in the empirical studies, see, e.g., Manning and Petrongolo (2017) for a discussion of the UK
labor markets and Williams (2017) for an analysis of the US working class. As recognized
in this literature, an exception to the ubiquitous locality of labor markets are markets for pro-
fessional and some managerial jobs—a small fraction of jobs in the economy—which are not
necessarily local. The externalities faced by the participants of non-local labor markets, are
more complex than those studied in our model and the empirical literature on secondary earn-
ers’ labor provision discussed above. For instance, the primary earner’s choice between jobs
in the UK and US, or between jobs on the East Coast and West Coast of the US, would affect
the secondary earner’s preferences between jobs in these countries or regions.28
4 Stable Matchings
As in classical matching theory, a key step in proving the existence of a stable matching is an
algorithm akin to the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Our generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm has two phases. First, we construct
an auxiliary matching `∗ such that 𝐶S (X|`∗) -S `∗. Then, we use `∗ to construct a stable
matching in a way resembling the classic deferred acceptance algorithm of David Gale and
27Other related findings include Johnson and Skinner (1986) who find that women increase their labor supply
prior to divorce; an evidence that their labor supply was lowered by high earnings of the spouse, an externality of
the type we study.
28For an analysis of location choices, see e.g. Costa and Kahn (2000) and Compton and Pollak (2007).
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Lloyd S. Shapley (1962) and, particularly, its extension by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005): we
run the algorithm in rounds, 𝑡 = 1,2, . . .. In any round 𝑡 ≥ 1, we denote by 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) the
set of contracts that are available to the sellers and buyers, respectively. Therefore, the set of
contracts held at the beginning of each round is 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡). We also track the reference sets
for each side: `𝑠 (𝑡) is the seller reference set and `𝑏 (𝑡) is the buyer reference set.29
Phase 1: Construction of an auxiliary matching `∗ such that `∗ %S 𝐶S (X|`∗). Set
`0 ≡∅ and define recursively `𝑘 ≡𝐶S (X|`𝑘−1) for every 𝑘 ≥ 1. Since the number of contracts
is finite, so is the number of sets of contracts. Therefore, there exist 𝑚 and 𝑛 ≤ 𝑚 such that
`𝑚+1 = `𝑛. Let 𝑚∗ = min{𝑚 |∃𝑛 ≤ 𝑚 s.t. `𝑚+1 = `𝑛}. Let `∗ ≡ `𝑚∗ . In the proof of Theorem 1,
we establish that `∗ %S 𝐶S (X|`∗).
Phase 2: Construction of a stable matching. Set 𝐴𝑠 (1) ≡ X (all contracts are available
to the sellers), 𝐴𝑏 (1) ≡ ∅ (no contracts are available to the buyers), and the reference sets are
`𝑠 (1) ≡ `∗, and `𝑏 (1) ≡ ∅. In each round 𝑡 = 1,2, . . ., we update these sets and matchings as
follows:
𝐴𝑠 (𝑡 +1) ≡ X \𝑅B
(
𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) |`𝑏 (𝑡)
)
,
𝐴𝑏 (𝑡 +1) ≡ X \𝑅S
(
𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) |`𝑠 (𝑡)
)
,
`𝑠 (𝑡 +1) ≡ 𝐶S
(
𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) |`𝑠 (𝑡)
)
, and
`𝑏 (𝑡 +1) ≡ 𝐶B
(
𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) |`𝑏 (𝑡)
)
.
Thus, the buyers reject some of the contracts available in 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) conditional on the refer-
ence set `𝑏 (𝑡) and the set of contracts not rejected by the buyers is available to the sellers
in the next round, i.e., 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡 +1) = X \𝑅B
(
𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) |`𝑏 (𝑡)
)
. Likewise, the sellers reject some con-
tracts available in 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) conditional on the reference set `𝑠 (𝑡) and the set of contracts that
are not rejected by the sellers is available to the buyers in the next round, i.e., 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡 + 1) =
X \ 𝑅S
(
𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) |`𝑠 (𝑡)
)
. We also update the reference sets: at the next round, the sellers’ refer-
29The tracking of reference sets has no counterpart in earlier formulations of the deferred acceptance algorithms
of, among many others, David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley (1962), Roth (1984), Adachi (2000), Fleiner (2003),
Echenique and Oviedo (2004), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Echenique and
Yenmez (2007), Ostrovsky (2008), Hatfield and Kojima (2010), and Bando (2014). In these papers, there is no
need to track reference sets and the deferred acceptance algorithm terminates when there are no more rejections
and no new offers. However, in our setting, the lack of rejections and new offers is not sufficient to stop the
algorithm and we need to run it until the reference sets converge. We run the algorithm in a symmetric way: in
each round agents on both sides respond to the offers and rejections from the previous round. This is formally
different from the standard approach where agents on the proposing side respond to rejections from the earlier
round but the agents on the accepting side respond to offers in the current round. This difference is not substantive:
we could run the deferred acceptance algorithm in the latter manner with straightforward adjustments.
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ence set is the set of contracts that sellers choose from 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) conditional on `𝑠 (𝑡) and likewise
for the buyers. We continue updating these sets until round 𝑇 such that 𝐴𝑠 (𝑇 +1) = 𝐴𝑠 (𝑇),
𝐴𝑏 (𝑇 +1) = 𝐴𝑏 (𝑇), `𝑠 (𝑇 +1) = `𝑠 (𝑇), and `𝑏 (𝑇 +1) = `𝑏 (𝑇). The outcome of the algorithm
is then 𝐴𝑠 (𝑇) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑇).
This is the seller-proposing version of the deferred-acceptance algorithm. The buyer-
proposing version can be defined analogously. The main result of this section establishes that
the algorithm terminates at some round despite the presence of externalities and, furthermore,
it produces a stable matching.
Theorem 1. (Sufficiency) Suppose that the choice functions satisfy substitutability. Then, the
algorithm terminates at some finite round 𝑇 , its outcome 𝐴𝑠 (𝑇) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑇) is stable, and
`𝑠 (𝑇) = `𝑏 (𝑇) = 𝐴𝑠 (𝑇) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑇) .
The proof relies on monotonicity properties of deferred acceptance transformation—and
in that it resembles other such proofs in the matching literature—but we need to address two
complications that are specific to the setting with externalities. First, the second phase of our
deferred acceptance procedure is monotonic only in some circumstances; it is the role of the
first phase to guarantee monotonicity of the second phase. Second, while the no-externalities
literature relies on Tarski’s fixed-point theorem (e.g., Adachi, 2000), we cannot do so because
we work with preorders rather than partial orders and the domain of the function that we
analyze is not a lattice. Instead, we use finiteness of the set of contracts to show that the iter-
ative application in the second phase must have two rounds at which the reference matchings
are equivalent in the preorder, `𝑠 ∼S ˜̀𝑠 and `𝑏 ∼B ˜̀𝑏, while the set of contracts available
to the buyers and sellers are the same, 𝐴𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠 and 𝐴𝑏 = ?̃?𝑏. Substitutability then implies
that 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) = 𝐶S ( ?̃?𝑠 | ˜̀𝑠) and 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏) = 𝐶B ( ?̃?𝑏 | ˜̀𝑏), thereby both the set of available
contracts and the reference sets have to be identical in the subsequent rounds implying that
the second phase converges. Once the deferred-acceptance algorithm converges, it produces a
stable matching. The proof of the last claim relies on a fixed-point characterization of stable
matchings presented in Appendix C whereas the details of the proof are provided in Appendix
D.
Next we provide a result which shows that monotone externalities is necessary for the
existence of a stable matching in a “maximal domain” sense when standard substitutability is
satisfied. In this result, we restrict attention to the minimal preorder.
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Theorem 2. (Necessity) Suppose that there exists an agent 𝑖 on side \ such that 𝑐𝑖 has external-
ities and satisfies standard substitutability. Then, there exist substitutable choice functions for
the other agents on side \ and substitutable choice functions without externalities for agents
on side −\ such that no stable matching exists.
Notice that in this theorem the choice function 𝑐𝑖 is fixed while choice functions of other
agents are constructed. In the construction, 𝐶\\{𝑖} and 𝐶−\ satisfy substitutability but 𝐶\ does
not.
To develop the intuition for the proof, consider a simple example with two workers 𝑖 and
𝑗 on side \ and one firm 𝑘 on side −\. For each worker-firm pair there is only one contract;
in particular, each worker’s choice satisfies standard substitutability. The firm wants to hire as
many workers as possible; the firm’s choice thus exhibits no externalities and satisfies substi-
tutability. Worker 𝑖’s choice function exhibits externalities and thus whether worker 𝑖 wants to
work or not depends on whether worker 𝑗 is hired by the firm or not. These externalities might
take one of two forms.
One possibility is that worker 𝑖 wants to work for the firm only when worker 𝑗 also works
for it. Let then worker 𝑗 be willing to work only when worker 𝑖 is not working; this choice of
worker 𝑗 is substitutable and, with the set of workers other than 𝑖 having only one member, it
satisfies monotone externalities (cf. Footnote 20). There is, however, no stable matching be-
cause worker 𝑗 blocks the matching in which both workers are employed, worker 𝑖 (or worker
𝑖 and the firm) blocks the matching in which exactly one worker is employed, and worker 𝑗
and the firm block the matching in which no workers are employed.
The other possibility is that worker 𝑖 wants to work for the firm only when worker 𝑗 does
not work for the firm. In this case, let worker 𝑗 be willing to work only when worker 𝑖 is
working. The analysis of this case is analogous to the previous one: our assumptions are
satisfied on the submarket without worker 𝑖 but there does not exist a stable matching.
When there are no externalities, Hatfield and Kominers (2017) show that standard sub-
stitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in many-to-many
matching markets. In contrast, we assume standard substitutability and show that monotone
externalities is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in many-to-many
matching markets when there are externalities.
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4.1 Illustrative Examples
In this section, we provide two examples to illustrate the deferred acceptance algorithm. In Ex-
ample 1, substitutability is satisfied, so the algorithm produces a stable matching. In Example
2, substitutability is not satisfied and a stable matching does not exist.
Like the standard deferred acceptance algorithm, in each round of phase 2, substitutability
implies that 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡 +1) ⊆ 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡 +1) ⊇ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡), i.e., the sellers make more offers to the
buyers while the buyers reject more contracts with each passing round (Lemma 2). As a con-
sequence, the sellers’ reference set gets worse and the buyers’ reference set gets better. Hence,
both of these two sets converge at some round 𝑡; however, the algorithm does not necessar-
ily terminate when 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡 +1) = 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) and 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡 +1) = 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡). Indeed, because of externalities,
the set of contracts held at such a round, 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡), is not necessarily stable. Instead, the
algorithm converges only when 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡), 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡 +1) = 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡), `𝑠 (𝑡 + 1) = `𝑠 (𝑡), and
`𝑏 (𝑡 +1) = `𝑏 (𝑡). The set of contracts held at such a round, 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) ∩ 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡), is stable.
The next example illustrates this point and shows the steps of the algorithm. It also demon-
strates that our algorithm can be viewed as an ascending auction in the presence of externalities.
Example 1. Suppose that there are two sellers 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 and two buyers 𝑏1 and 𝑏2. Seller 𝑠1
and buyer 𝑏1 can sign contract 𝑥1 and seller 𝑠1 and buyer 𝑏2 can sign contract 𝑥2. Seller 𝑠2 can
sign contract 𝑥3 with buyer 𝑏2 only.30 The contractual structure is demonstrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Contractual structure in Example 1.
Seller choice functions do not have externalities. Seller 𝑠1 always chooses one contract, if
there exists one, and prefers contract 𝑥2 over 𝑥1 and seller 𝑠2 chooses contract 𝑥3 when it is
available. Therefore, seller choice functions satisfy standard substitutability. They also satisfy
monotone externalities because there are no externalities for sellers.
Buyer 𝑏1 chooses contract 𝑥1 regardless of the contracts signed by buyer 𝑏2. Conditional
on the empty set, buyer 𝑏2 chooses one contract only and prefers contract 𝑥3 to 𝑥2. Conditional
30This example is a special case of Application 1 with the following interpretation. Sellers are firms and buyers
are workers. Buyers 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are married. Buyer 𝑏1 is a woman; her choice function does not have externalities.
Buyer 𝑏2 is a man and the outside option of not working is ranked higher whenever his wife works. In particular,
contract 𝑥2 is ranked below the outside option if the wife has a job.
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on the reference set {𝑥1}, buyer 𝑏2 chooses contract 𝑥3, if it is available, and rejects 𝑥2, if it is
available. Therefore, the only choice function that has externalities is that of buyer 𝑏2, which
is summarized by the following table.
{𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥2} ∅
𝑐𝑏2 (·|{𝑥1}) {𝑥3} {𝑥3} ∅ ∅
𝑐𝑏2 (·|∅) {𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥2} ∅
Table 1: Choice function of buyer 𝑏2 in Example 1. Columns are indexed by the set of available
contracts and rows are indexed by the reference set of contracts signed by buyer 𝑏1.
First let us construct the better market condition for buyers. Since buyer 𝑏1 chooses contract
𝑥1 whenever it is available, we have {𝑥1} %𝑏1 ∅. For buyer 𝑏2, using consistency on sets of
contracts {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ⊇ {𝑥2} ⊇ ∅ with the empty set as a reference set, we get {𝑥3} %𝑏2 {𝑥2} %𝑏2 ∅.
In addition, since {𝑥1} %𝑏1 ∅, 𝑐𝑏2 ({𝑥2}|{𝑥1}) = ∅, and 𝑐𝑏2 ({𝑥2}|∅) = {𝑥2}, we get ∅ %𝑏2 {𝑥2}.
Therefore, for buyer 𝑏2, {𝑥3} %𝑏2 {𝑥2} ∼𝑏2 ∅. The better market condition for buyers %B is then
defined as `′ %B ` ⇔ `′
𝑏𝑖
%𝑏𝑖 `𝑏𝑖 for every 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. For example, {𝑥1, 𝑥2} %B {𝑥1} because
{𝑥1} %𝑏1 {𝑥1} and {𝑥2} %𝑏2 ∅. Similarly, {𝑥1} %B {𝑥2} because {𝑥1} %𝑏1 ∅ and ∅ %𝑏2 {𝑥2}.
It is easy to check that standard substitutability is satisfied for the buyers. To check mono-
tone externalities, note that choice function of buyer 𝑏1 does not have externalities, so it does
not depend on the reference set and the choice function of buyer 𝑏2 rejects more contracts when
it is conditional on the reference set {𝑥1} rather than the reference set ∅, where {𝑥1} %𝑏1 ∅.
Since the choice functions satisfy substitutability, the deferred-acceptance algorithm pro-
duces a stable matching (Theorem 1). We now show how it works in this example. In the first
phase, we start with `0 = ∅. Then, `1 = 𝐶S (X|`0) = {𝑥2, 𝑥3}, and `2 = 𝐶S (X|`1) = {𝑥2, 𝑥3}.
Since `1 = `2, we set `∗ = {𝑥2, 𝑥3}.
In the first round of the second phase, all contracts are available to the sellers, so they
choose {𝑥2, 𝑥3}. However, no contract is available to the buyers, so they choose the empty set.
Therefore, in the second round, the seller reference set is {𝑥2, 𝑥3} and the buyer reference set
is the empty set. In addition, the set of contracts available to the buyers is the set of contracts
not rejected by the sellers at the first round, which is {𝑥2, 𝑥3}.
The algorithm continues to proceed in this way. Table 2 shows all the rounds. Notice that
between the fourth and fifth rounds the sets of contracts available to the buyers and sellers
are the same, i.e., 𝐴𝑏 (4) = 𝐴𝑏 (5) and 𝐴𝑠 (4) = 𝐴𝑠 (5). In the standard deferred acceptance
algorithm, we could stop the algorithm here. In our setting, the deferred acceptance does
not converge yet because the reference sets for the buyers are different at these two rounds.
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𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) `𝑠 (𝑡) `𝑏 (𝑡) 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) |`𝑠 (𝑡)) 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) |`𝑏 (𝑡))
𝑡 = 1 X ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅
𝑡 = 2 X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3}
𝑡 = 3 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥3}
𝑡 = 4 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3}
𝑡 = 5 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3}
𝑡 = 6 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3}
Table 2: Rounds of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm in Example 1.
The algorithm eventually converges at the sixth round and produces the matching 𝐴𝑠 (6) ∩
𝐴𝑏 (6) = {𝑥1, 𝑥3}, which is stable: It is individually rational for all agents. There is only one
potential blocking pair (𝑠1, 𝑏2) via contract 𝑥2 but they do not block this matching because
𝑥2 ∉ 𝑐𝑏2 ({𝑥2, 𝑥3}|{𝑥1}).
Note that the set of contracts available to the sellers, 𝐴𝑠 (𝑡), is shrinking and the set of
contracts available to the buyers, 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡), is expanding as the algorithm proceeds. Likewise, the
seller reference set `𝑠 (𝑡) is getting worse for the sellers and the buyer reference set `𝑏 (𝑡) is
getting better for the buyers. 
When choice functions satisfy standard substitutability, DA produces a stable matching if
it converges even if monotone externalities is not satisfied (see Theorem 7 and Lemma 3 in
Appendix C). However, when monotone externalities fails, it does not have to converge and a
stable matching need not exist. We show these two claims with the following example.
Example 2. We modify Example 1 by changing the choice function of buyer 𝑏2. Buyer 𝑏2
chooses all available contracts conditional on the reference set {𝑥1}. Furthermore, conditional
on the empty set, she chooses contract 𝑥3, if it is available, and rejects 𝑥2, if it is available.
Choice function of buyer 𝑏2 is summarized by the following table.
{𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥2} ∅
𝑐𝑏2 (·|{𝑥1}) {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥2} ∅
𝑐𝑏2 (·|∅) {𝑥3} {𝑥3} ∅ ∅
Table 3: Choice function of buyer 𝑏2 in Example 2. Columns are indexed by the set of available
contracts and rows are indexed by the reference set of contracts signed by buyer 𝑏1.
As in the previous example, it is easy to check that standard substitutability is satisfied
for buyers. However, monotone externalities fails. To see this, note that for any consistent
preorder we need {𝑥1} %𝑏1 ∅. But conditional on {𝑥1}, buyer 𝑏2 accepts more contracts than
conditional on the empty set when the available set of contracts is {𝑥2, 𝑥3}.
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While our general result implies that there exists a stable matching in Example 1, it is easy
to see that there is no stable matching in Example 2: Matchings ∅ and {𝑥3} are blocked by
seller 𝑠1 and buyer 𝑏1 via contract 𝑥1. Matchings {𝑥1} and {𝑥1, 𝑥2} are blocked by seller 𝑠2 and
buyer 𝑏2 via contract 𝑥3. Matchings {𝑥2} and {𝑥2, 𝑥3} are not individually rational for buyer
𝑏2. Matching {𝑥1, 𝑥3} is blocked by seller 𝑠1 and buyer 𝑏2 via contract 𝑥2. The last remaining
matching, X, is not individually rational for seller 𝑠1.
Now let us consider the deferred-acceptance algorithm. The first phase works as in the
previous example since seller choice functions satisfy substitutability. The algorithm starts
diverging after round five of the second phase because conditional on the reference set `𝑏 (5) =
{𝑥1, 𝑥3}, the buyers choose all contracts. Table 4 shows the first nine rounds of DA.
𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) 𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) `𝑠 (𝑡) `𝑏 (𝑡) 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 (𝑡) |`𝑠 (𝑡)) 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 (𝑡) |`𝑏 (𝑡))
𝑡 = 1 X ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅
𝑡 = 2 X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} ∅ {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3}
𝑡 = 3 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥3}
𝑡 = 4 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3}
𝑡 = 5 {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X
𝑡 = 6 X X {𝑥1, 𝑥3} X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} X
𝑡 = 7 X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3}
𝑡 = 8 X {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥2, 𝑥3} {𝑥3}








Table 4: Rounds of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm in Example 2.
At round nine, we get the same sets of contracts available to the buyers and sellers and
the same reference sets as in round three. Therefore, the algorithm does not converge. This
outcome is not surprising because we showed that there is no stable matching in this example.

5 Properties of Stable Matchings under Externalities
Two key normative properties in the standard theory of stable matchings is Pareto efficiency of
stable matchings and the existence of side-optimal stable matchings. In this section, we extend
them to settings with externalities.
Pareto efficiency extends to our setting as follows.
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Theorem 3. (Pareto Efficiency) Suppose that the choice functions satisfy standard substi-
tutability. If matching ` is stable then it is Pareto efficient in the following sense: there is no
other matching a ≠ ` such that a𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 (a∪ ` |`) for every agent 𝑖.
The argument in the proof resembles a similar idea in the no-externalities case. We prove
a stronger result in Appendix B (Proposition 1).
The counterpart of the side-optimal stable matchings in the setting with externalities is
more subtle and it is given by the following result. Before stating this result, we define the
following concepts.
Definition 5. A stable matching ` is \-optimal if ` %\ `′ for every stable matching `′, it is
\-pessimal if ` -\ `′ for every stable matching `′.
In the standard stable matching theory without externalities, side optimality is measured
with respect to the Blair order. This standard result is subsumed.
Theorem 4. (Side Optimality) Suppose that the choice functions satisfy substitutability and,
in addition, for side \ there exists a matching ¯̀\ such that for any `, 𝑋 ⊆ X, we have ¯̀\ %\
𝐶\ (𝑋 |`). Then, the \-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm when the reference set for side
\ is ¯̀\ produces a \-optimal stable matching, which is also a −\-pessimal stable matching.
The assumption that there exists a matching ¯̀\ such that for any matching `, 𝑋 ⊆ X, ¯̀\ %\
𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) plays a crucial role in the proof of Theorem 4. It is not innocuous but it is satisfied
in our applications provided in Section 3 and Appendix F. In the absence of externalities, this
assumption is automatically satisfied because %\ is the Blair order. Indeed, for this special
case, we can take ¯̀\ to be 𝐶\ (X). Then for any 𝑋 ⊆ X,
X ⊇ ¯̀\ ∪𝐶\ (𝑋) ⊇ 𝐶\ (X) = ¯̀\
and the irrelevance of rejected contracts yield 𝐶\ ( ¯̀\ ∪𝐶\ (𝑋)) = 𝐶\ (X) = ¯̀\ . This implies
¯̀\ %\ 𝐶\ (𝑋) for any 𝑋 . Thus, Theorem 4 subsumes the standard insight that, in the absence of
externalities, \-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces the \-optimal stable match-
ing with respect to the Blair order if choice functions satisfy substitutability. This matching is
also (−\)-pessimal.
Before we end this section, we provide an example which shows the displayed assumption
in Theorem 4 is necessary. In addition, this example also shows that the set of stable matchings
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need not have a lattice structure even when choice functions satisfy substitutability.31
Example 3. Suppose that there are two buyers 𝑏1, 𝑏2 and one seller, 𝑠1. There is only one
contract associated with every seller-buyer pair. Let the contract between 𝑏1 and 𝑠1 be 𝑥1 and
the contract between 𝑏2 and 𝑠1 be 𝑥2. Since there is only one seller, there are no externalities
for the seller side.
Choice functions are as follows: Seller 𝑠1 chooses all contracts available. Buyer 𝑏1 chooses
𝑥1 conditional on the reference set {𝑥2} and rejects 𝑥1 conditional on the empty set. Buyer 𝑏2
chooses 𝑥2 conditional on the reference set {𝑥1} and rejects 𝑥2 conditional on the empty set.
That is each buyer chooses their contract only if the other buyer has the other contract.
Choice function of the seller satisfies substitutability. For buyers, consider the preorder %B
with the domain {∅} such that ∅ %B ∅. Thus this preorder does not compare any other pairs
of matchings.32 This preorder is consistent because conditional on the empty set both buyers
do not choose any contract. In addition, the buyer-side choice function satisfies substitutability
because the buyer-side rejection function is monotone conditional on the empty set.
There exists no buyer-optimal stable matching in this example because both the empty
set and {𝑥1, 𝑥2} are stable matchings, which cannot be compared by the preorder %B . This
is compatible with Theorem 4 because there exists no buyer-optimal matching ¯̀B such that
¯̀B %B 𝐶B (𝑋 |`) for all matchings `, 𝑋 , which is the additional assumption needed for the
existence of a buyer-optimal stable matching. In addition, the set of stable matchings does not
have a lattice structure. 
Remark 1. Suppose that agents are members of coalitions and coordinate their choices. Ex-
amples include couples, sports teams, corporate divisions, single firms, or even multiple firms
controlled by the same owner. If an outside observer is unaware that the coalition—rather
than the agents—is the decision maker, the outside observer might infer that the choices of
the coalition members exhibit externalities. The standard matching theory without external-
ities guarantees the existence of stable matchings and their properties among such coalitions
provided coalitional choice functions satisfy the standard substitutes condition (Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005; Hatfield and Kominers, 2017). In particular, the standard theory guarantees
the existence of stable matchings that are side-optimal for the coalitions. As the above example
31In contrast, when there are no externalities, standard substitutability implies that the set of stable matchings is
a lattice (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). Such a structure may also exist in our setting under additional assumptions.
We leave this question for future research.
32In general, we allow the domain of the preorder to be smaller than the set of all matchings, which is the case
in this example.
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shows, in our framework, the existence of side-optimal stable matchings is not guaranteed, and
indeed, the above example cannot be reinterpreted as coalitional choice where buyers form
a coalition with a choice function 𝐶B that has no externalities: To have {𝑥1, 𝑥2} as a stable
matching as in the example, we need the coalitional choice to satisfy 𝐶B ({𝑥1, 𝑥2}) = {𝑥1, 𝑥2}.
Then substitutability implies that𝐶B (𝑋) = {𝑋} for every 𝑋 ⊆ {𝑥1, 𝑥2}. Therefore, every match-
ing is stable with this coalitional choice unlike the example above which has only two stable
matchings.
6 A Characterization of Substitutable Choice Functions
Which choice functions are substitutable? We establish a simple structure of substitutable
choice functions. We describe the structure using the standard matching concept of truncation
(see Roth and Rothblum (1999)). Linear order ′ over X𝑖 ∪{∅} is a truncation of linear order
 over X𝑖 ∪ {∅} if, for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ X𝑖 the following two implications hold true:
• 𝑥 ′ ∅ implies 𝑥  ∅, and
• 𝑥 ′ 𝑦 ′ ∅ implies 𝑥  𝑦  ∅.
In words, any contract ranked above the empty set by the linear order ′ is also ranked above
the empty set by the linear order  and the relative ranking of any two contracts preferred to
the empty set in the linear order ′ is the same as in the linear order . Therefore, a truncation
of a linear order moves the outside option ∅ higher in the ranking.
The next result characterizes choice functions satisfying our substitutability condition.
Theorem 5. (Characterization of Substitutability) Choice function𝐶\ satisfies substitutability
if, and only if, for every agent 𝑖 ∈ \ there is a nonempty set J and linear orders `−𝑖
𝑗
over
X𝑖 ∪ {∅} indexed by 𝑗 ∈ J and matching `−𝑖 that does not include 𝑖’s contracts such that
if `′−𝑖 %
\ `−𝑖 %\ ∅ then for any 𝑗 ∈ J , 
`′−𝑖
𝑗
is a truncation of `−𝑖
𝑗
. Furthermore, for any
𝑋, ` ⊆ X,








is the maximum element of 𝑋𝑖 ∪ {∅} in order `−𝑖𝑗 .
This result is inspired by the Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) decomposition result for
substitutable functions when there are no externalities. It states that the choice function can
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be constructed from a set of linear orders over individual contracts such that the choice from
a set conditional on a reference set is the union of the most-preferred contracts with respect
to these linear orders. In this representation, the linear orders depend on the reference set and
as the reference set gets better with respect to the better market condition the linear orders are
truncated.33
Theorem 5 takes a particularly simple form in the context of the local labor market model
of Section 3. In the simplest version of this model, each couple in the labor market consists
of a primary and a secondary earner. The choices of a primary earner exhibits no externalities
and hence any choice function of a primary earner satisfies our substitutes condition. Choices
of a secondary earner can exhibit externalities and the choice function of a secondary satisfies
the substitutes condition if and only if it is represented by a family of rankings indexed by
the contract of the primary earner and these rankings only differ in how being unemployed is
ranked: the higher the wage of the primary earner is, the higher is the reservation wage of the
secondary earner.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a two-sided matching problem with externalities where each
agent’s choice depends on other agents’ contracts. For such settings, we have developed the
theory of stable matchings by introducing a new substitutability condition when externalities
are present. More explicitly, we have studied the existence of stable matchings, Pareto effi-
ciency of stable matchings, side-optimal stable matchings, the deferred acceptance algorithm,
and the rural hospitals theorem (which is in Appendix A). Unlike the previous matching litera-
ture, we have not relied on fixed point theorems; instead, we have used elementary techniques
to overcome the difficulties associated with externalities.
The standard substitutability condition can be weakened without affecting our results in
two different ways. In the first approach, the reference set can be restricted to be a set that can
be chosen by side \. More formally, consider the minimal set of matchings A\ that contains
the empty set and satisfies 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) ∈ A\ whenever 𝑋 ⊆ X and ` ∈ A\ . The minimal such
33Can we interpret rankings `−𝑖
𝑗
in this theorem as preferences of sub-agents for agent 𝑖? Such an interpretation
runs into the problem that two or more of the sub-agents might rank the same contract 𝑥 as their best contract
from a choice set and, in general, it is not possible to designate one of these subagents to be the signatory of 𝑥.
In fact, Remark 1 above shows that—despite Theorem 5—our conditions cannot be in general reinterpreted as
coalitional choices. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising the question.
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domain is A\ ≡ ∪
𝑡=0,1,...
A\𝑡 where A\0 ≡ {∅} and A
\
𝑡 for 𝑡 ≥ 1 are defined recursively
A\𝑡 ≡ {𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) : 𝑋 ⊆ X, ` ∈ A\𝑡−1} ∪A
\
𝑡−1.
Since there exists a finite number of contracts, A\ is well-defined; it is the set of all match-
ings that can be reached from the empty set by applying the choice function 𝐶\ . Standard
substitutability can be weakened by imposing it only for reference sets in A\ .
The second approach to weaken standard substitutability works only when agents on one
side of the market have unit demand using the techniques developed in Hatfield and Kojima
(2010), Hatfield and Kominers (2016), and Hatfield, Kominers and Westkamp (2017) when
there are no externalities. These conditions usually proceed by restricting 𝑋′ and 𝑋 under
which the standard substitutability condition holds. Such conditions can also be studied in our
setting when one side of the market can sign at most one contract. Furthermore, a combination
of the two approaches can be used when agents on one side of the market have unit demand.
We believe that our notion of substitutability will be useful to study other important ques-
tions in matching markets with externalities. For example, the relations between pairwise
stability, group stability, core, and other stability concepts have been an important question in
classical matching theory at least since Blair (1988). We analyze the relation between pairwise
and group stability in Appendix B, but many related questions remain open. The strategy-
proofness of deferred acceptance algorithm (for the proposing side) has been another important
question extensively studied since Lester E Dubins and David A Freedman (1981). We think
that a deferred acceptance procedure remains strategy-proof in our setting provided we impose
the law of aggregate demand à la Hatfield and Milgrom (2005); we leave an exploration of
this question for future work. Furthermore, even though we have studied two-sided markets,
we think that our techniques are applicable to more general markets such as the supply chain
networks of Ostrovsky (2008) where externalities may naturally appear.34
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Appendix A: Law of Aggregate Demand and the Rural Hos-
pitals Theorem
In this section, we provide a generalization of the law of aggregate demand (Hatfield and Mil-
grom, 2005) and size monotonicity (Alkan and Gale, 2003). In markets without externalities,
this generalization is due to Fleiner (2003). For each contract 𝑥 ∈ X, there is a corresponding
weight denoted by 𝑤(𝑥) ∈ R. The generalized law of aggregate demand requires that for agent
𝑖 ∈ \ the total weight of contracts chosen from 𝑋 conditional on ` is weakly smaller than the
total weight of contracts chosen from 𝑋′ conditional on `′ for any 𝑋′ ⊇ 𝑋 and `′ %\ `. For a
set of contracts 𝑋 ⊆ X, let 𝑤(𝑋) ≡ ∑
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑤(𝑥). We provide a formal definition as follows.
Definition 6. Choice function 𝑐𝑖 satisfies the law of aggregate demand if 𝑖 ∈ \ and for any
𝑋 ⊆ 𝑋′ and ` -\ `′ then 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`)) ≤ 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝑋′|`′)).
Previous definitions in the matching literature are restricted to the settings without external-
ities, and assume that the weight on all contracts are positive and equal (with the only exception
of Fleiner (2003)). Under this assumption, the generalized law of aggregate demand reduces
to for any 𝑋 ⊆ 𝑋′ and ` ⊆ X, |𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) | ≤ |𝑐𝑖 (𝑋′|`) |. In terms of the demand metaphor of
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), all contracts are traded at price one. In contrast, we allow any
prices.
We study how the weight of contracts changes for an agent in different stable matchings.
We show that the weight remains the same regardless of the stable matching. This extends the
rural hospitals theorem of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) in two directions: We allow different
contracts to have different weights and also preferences of an agent can depend on contracts
signed by others.
Theorem 6. (Rural Hospital Theorem) Suppose that choice functions satisfy substitutability
and the law of aggregate demand, and that there exists a matching ¯̀\ such that for any `, 𝑋 ⊆
33
X, we have ¯̀\ %\ 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`). Then, for any two stable matchings ` and `′, 𝑤(`𝑖) = 𝑤(`′𝑖) for
every agent 𝑖.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that \ = 𝑠. Then, by Theorem 4, there exists a stable
matching `∗, which is seller-optimal and buyer-pessimal simultaneously. We show that for
any stable matching `, 𝑤(`𝑖) = 𝑤(`∗𝑖 ). As it is shown in the proof of Theorem 4, 𝑓 has two
fixed points (𝐴∗𝑠, 𝐴∗𝑏, `∗, `∗) and (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) such that (𝐴∗𝑠, 𝐴∗𝑏, `∗, `∗) w (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `).
Therefore, 𝐴∗𝑠 ⊇ 𝐴𝑠, 𝐴∗𝑏 ⊆ 𝐴𝑏, `∗ %S ` and `∗ -B `. Now by the law of aggregate de-
mand for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝐴∗𝑠 |`∗)) ≥ 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝐴𝑠 |`)), which is equivalent to 𝑤(`∗𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑤(`𝑖) since
(𝐴∗𝑠, 𝐴∗𝑏, `∗, `∗) and (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) are fixed points of 𝑓 . When this is summed over all sell-
ers, we get 𝑤(`∗) ≥ 𝑤(`). Similarly, for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝐵, 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝐴∗𝑏 |`∗)) ≤ 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝐴𝑏 |`)), which is
equivalent to 𝑤(`∗
𝑖
) ≤ 𝑤(`𝑖) since (𝐴∗𝑠, 𝐴∗𝑏, `∗, `∗) and (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) are fixed points of 𝑓 .
When summed over all buyers, this implies 𝑤(`∗) ≤ 𝑤(`). Therefore, 𝑤(`∗) = 𝑤(`), more-
over, all of the individual inequalities must hold as equalities implying that for any agent 𝑖,
𝑤(`∗
𝑖
) = 𝑤(`𝑖). 
Remark 2. In the special case when all weights are strictly positive, under the assumptions of
Theorem 6, an agent’s choice from the same set conditional on two ranked matchings needs
to be the same. Indeed, let 𝑖 ∈ \ be an agent. Suppose that 𝑋, `, `′ ⊆ X are such that ` -\
`′. Then, by substitutability, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) ⊇ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′). But the law of aggregate demand implies
that 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`)) ≤ 𝑤(𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′)). Since all weights are strictly positive, we get that 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`) =
𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′). This argument does not mean that there are no externalities because the choice
conditional on two matchings that are not ranked with respect to %\ can still be different.
Appendix B: Group Stability
In this section, we provide a definition of a blocking set of contracts and the corresponding
definition of group stability. Then we show a result relating stable matchings and group stable
matchings.
A set 𝑋 ⊆ X blocks matching ` if 𝑋 * ` and for all 𝑖 ∈ I we have 𝑋𝑖 ⊆ 𝑐𝑖 (`∪ 𝑋 |`). Less
formally, conditional on matching `, every agent who is associated with a contract in 𝑋 wants
to sign all contracts in 𝑋 associated with them. In this case, 𝑋 is also called a blocking set
for `. A matching is group stable if it is individually rational for all agents and there is no
blocking set of contracts. Without externalities, this stability concept has been used before
(see, e.g., Roth, 1984 and Hatfield and Kominers, 2017).
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Proposition 1. [Equivalence of Stability and Group Stability] Suppose that choice functions
satisfy substitutability. Then a matching is stable if, and only if, it is group stable.
See Roth and Sotomayor (1990); Echenique and Oviedo (2006); Hatfield and Kominers
(2017) for earlier developments of this equivalence when there are no externalities. In partic-
ular, Hatfield and Kominers (2017) prove the same result when there are no externalities. The
same proof works in our setting as well. More precisely, the following lemma is enough to
prove the proposition, which only requires standard substitutability.
Lemma 1. Suppose 𝑋 blocks matching ` and choice functions satisfy standard substitutability.
Then for every 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 \ `, {𝑥} blocks `.
Proof. If 𝑋 is a blocking set, then 𝑋 ⊆ 𝐶S (`∪𝑋 |`) ∩𝐶B (`∪𝑋 |`). Take any 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 \ `. Since
choice function 𝑐𝑖 satisfies standard substitutability, we have 𝑟𝑖 (`∪ {𝑥}|`) ⊆ 𝑟𝑖 (`∪ 𝑋 |`) for
every agent 𝑖. This implies 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (`∪{𝑥}|`) for every 𝑖, so 𝑥 ∈𝐶S (`∪{𝑥}|`)∩𝐶B (`∪{𝑥}|`).
Therefore, {𝑥} is a blocking set for `. 
Appendix C: Fixed-Point Approach to Stability
Our analysis of the existence of stable matchings builds on the fixed-point methods used in
Adachi (2000), Fleiner (2003), Echenique and Oviedo (2004, 2006), Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005), Bando (2014), and others. In this section, we construct a function that mimics the
iterative step of the deferred-acceptance algorithm and study properties of its fixed points.
Each iteration in the second phase of our deferred-acceptance algorithm can be described
as the following transformation function
𝑓
(




X\𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏), X\𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠), 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) , 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏)
)
,
where 𝑓 is a function from 2X ×2X ×2X ×2X into itself.
Function 𝑓 has two important properties, monotonicity and stability of its fixed points, that
are captured in the following auxiliary results.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the choice functions satisfy substitutability. Then function 𝑓 is mono-
tone increasing with respect to the preorder v defined as follows:
(𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏) v ( ?̃?𝑠, ?̃?𝑏, ˜̀𝑠, ˜̀𝑏) ⇐⇒ 𝐴𝑠 ⊆ ?̃?𝑠, 𝐴𝑏 ⊇ ?̃?𝑏, `𝑠 -S ˜̀𝑠, `𝑏 %B ˜̀𝑏 .
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Proof. Function 𝑓 is monotonic in v because for any 𝐴𝑠 ⊆ 𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏 ⊇ ?̃?𝑏, `𝑠 -S ˜̀𝑠, `𝑏 %B ˜̀𝑏,
substitutability implies that
X\𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏) ⊆ X\𝑅B ( ?̃?𝑏 | ˜̀𝑏),
X\𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) ⊇ X\𝑅S ( ?̃?𝑠 | ˜̀𝑠),
and consistency implies that
𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) -S 𝐶S ( ?̃?𝑠 | ˜̀𝑠),
𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏) %B 𝐶B ( ?̃?𝑏 | ˜̀𝑏).
Therefore, (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏) v ( ?̃?𝑠, ?̃?𝑏, ˜̀𝑠, ˜̀𝑏) implies that 𝑓 (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏) v 𝑓 ( ?̃?𝑠, ?̃?𝑏, ˜̀𝑠, ˜̀𝑏).

The fixed points of 𝑓 satisfy the following properties even when the choice functions do
not satisfy substitutability or monotone externalities.
Lemma 3. Let
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏
)
be a fixed point of function 𝑓 . Then 𝐴𝑠 ∪ 𝐴𝑏 = X and
`𝑠 = `𝑏 = 𝐴𝑠 ∩ 𝐴𝑏 = 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏) = 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠).




⊇ 𝐴𝑠 ∪ [X \ 𝐴𝑠] = X, so
𝐴𝑠 ∪ 𝐴𝑏 = X.




= 𝐴𝑠 \ 𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) = 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠), which implies




= 𝐴𝑠∩𝐴𝑏. Finally, `𝑠 =𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠)





`𝑠 = `𝑏 = 𝐴𝑠 ∩ 𝐴𝑏 = 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏) = 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) .

When choice functions satisfy standard substitutability, a matching is stable if, and only if,
it can be supported as a fixed point of 𝑓 .
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Theorem 7. (Characterization of Stability) Suppose that the choice functions satisfy standard
substitutability. Then a matching ` is stable if, and only if, there exist sets of contracts 𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏 ⊆
X such that
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of function 𝑓 .
Proof. First, suppose that
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of 𝑓 . Claim 1 below shows that ` is a
stable matching.
Claim 1. Suppose that the choice functions satisfy standard substitutability. Then matching
` is stable.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that ` is not stable. Then there are three possibilities, all
of which we proceed to rule out.
1. Matching ` is not individually rational for some seller 𝑗 , that is 𝑐 𝑗 (` |`) ( ` 𝑗 . Since(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of 𝑓 , 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`) = ` and 𝐴𝑠 ⊇ `. But standard substitutabil-
ity and 𝑐 𝑗 (` |`) ( ` 𝑗 imply that there is a contract 𝑥 ∈ ` 𝑗 rejected out of 𝐴𝑠 by agent 𝑗 ,
that is 𝑥 ∉ 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`), a contradiction.
2. Matching ` is not individually rational for some buyer 𝑖, that is 𝑐𝑖 (` |`) ( `𝑖. This is
analogous to the previous case since 𝑓 treats buyers and sellers symmetrically.
3. There exists a blocking pair 𝑖 ∈ B and 𝑗 ∈ S with contract 𝑥 ∈ X𝑖 ∩X𝑗 such that 𝑥 ∉ `
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (` ∪ {𝑥} |`) ∩ 𝑐 𝑗 (` ∪ {𝑥} |`). Since
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of 𝑓 , by
Lemma 3, 𝐴𝑠 ∪ 𝐴𝑏 = X. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume that 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝑏.
Again, since
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of 𝑓 , by Lemma 3, 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) = `, which
implies that 𝑐𝑖 (𝐴𝑏 |`) = `𝑖. By the irrelevance of rejected contracts, for any set 𝑌 such
that 𝐴𝑏 ⊇ 𝑌 ⊇ `, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌 |`) = `𝑖. In particular, for 𝑌 = `∪ {𝑥}, 𝑐𝑖 (`∪ {𝑥}|`) = `𝑖, which
is a contradiction because 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (`∪ {𝑥}|`) \ `.
To finish the proof of the theorem, we need to show that if matching ` is stable then there exist
sets of contracts 𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏 such that
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed point of 𝑓 . The following is useful in
our construction of 𝐴𝑠 and 𝐴𝑏.
Claim 2. Suppose that the choice functions satisfy standard substitutability. Then the func-
tion 𝑀\ (`) ≡ max{𝑋 ⊆ X|𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) = `}, where the maximum is with respect to set inclusion,
is well defined. Moreover, for any contract 𝑥 ∉ 𝑀\ (`), 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) ∪ 𝑥 |`).
Proof. If there are two sets 𝑀′ and 𝑀′′ such that 𝐶\ (𝑀′|`) = 𝐶\ (𝑀′′|`) = `, then (by
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standard substitutability)

















If 𝐶\ (𝑀′∪𝑀′′|`) was a proper subset of `, then the irrelevance of rejected contracts would
imply that 𝐶\ (𝑀′|`) = 𝐶\ (𝑀′′|`) = 𝐶\ (𝑀′ ∪𝑀′′|`), which is a contradiction. Therefore,
𝑀\ (`) is well defined. Let 𝑥 ∉ 𝑀\ (`). If 𝑥 ∉ 𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) ∪ 𝑥 |`), then 𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) ∪ 𝑥 |`) =
𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) |`) by the irrelevance of rejected contracts. But this implies 𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) ∪ 𝑥 |`) = `,
which contradicts maximality of 𝑀\ (`). Hence, 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶\ (𝑀\ (`) ∪ 𝑥 |`).
Claim 3. Suppose that matching ` is stable and the choice functions satisfy standard
substitutability. Then there exist sets of contracts 𝐴𝑠 and 𝐴𝑏 such that
(
𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `
)
is a fixed
point of 𝑓 .
Proof. By Claim 2, there exists the largest set 𝑀\ (`) = max{𝑋 ⊆ X|𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) = `}. Let
𝐴𝑠 ≡ 𝑀S (`) and 𝐴𝑏 ≡ X \ 𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`). By construction of 𝑀S (`), ` = 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`). Thus, we
get 𝐴𝑠 ∩ 𝐴𝑏 = 𝐴𝑠 ∩ (X \ 𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`)) = 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`) = `. To finish the proof, we need to show
` = 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) and 𝐴𝑠 = X \𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`).
Note that 𝐴𝑏 = X \ 𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`) = (X \ 𝐴𝑠) ∪𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`) = (X \ 𝐴𝑠) ∪ `. Therefore, 𝐴𝑏 ⊇ `.
If 𝑌 ≡ 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) ≠ `, there are two cases, both of which contradict stability of `. First, if
𝑌 ( `, then the irrelevance of rejected contracts implies 𝐶B (` |`) = 𝑌 , implying that ` is not
individually rational for some buyers, contradicting stability. Second, if𝑌 * `, then there exists
𝑦 ∈𝑌 \`, and 𝑦 ∈𝐶B (`∪{𝑦}|`) by standard substitutability since 𝑦 ∈𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) and 𝐴𝑏 ⊇ `∪
{𝑦}. But we also have that 𝑦 ∈𝐶S (𝐴𝑠∪{𝑦}|`) by Claim 2. Then the agents associated with {𝑦}
block `, contradicting stability. Thus, the only case consistent with stability is 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) = `.
Finally, we show that 𝐴𝑠 =X\𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`) =X\𝑅B (X\𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`) |`). Since 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`) = `,
then X \ 𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`) = X \ (𝐴𝑏 \ `) = X \ (((X \ 𝐴𝑠) ∪ `) \ `) = X \ (X \ 𝐴𝑠) = 𝐴𝑠 and we have
the result. 
Appendix D: Proofs
In this appendix, we provide the omitted proofs.
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Minimal Preorder
In Section 2, we defined minimal preorder and asserted its existence and uniqueness. We prove
these claims in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists a unique minimal preorder that is consistent with the side choice
function 𝐶\ .
Proof. Consider the following preorder %̃𝑖 for agent 𝑖 ∈ \: for every `𝑖, `′𝑖 ⊆ X𝑖, `𝑖 %̃𝑖 `′𝑖 . Let
%̃
\ be the corresponding preorder for side \. Preorder %̃\ is consistent with the choice function
𝐶\ because for every 𝑋′ ⊇ 𝑋 and `′ %̃\ `, we have 𝐶\ (𝑋′|`′) %̃\ 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`). Hence, there exists
at least one preorder consistent with 𝐶\ . Now, let us construct a minimal one.
Suppose that {%\1,%
\
2, . . . ,%
\
𝑘
} is the set of all preorders for side \ that are consistent with
choice function 𝐶\ . Define the following binary relation: `′ %\ ` if, and only if, `′ %\
𝑗
`
for every 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘 . The binary relation %\ is reflexive and transitive, so it is a preorder.
Furthermore, ∅ %\ ∅ since the same relation holds for each %\
𝑗
for every 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘 .
Now we show that %\ is consistent with the side choice function 𝐶\ . Let 𝑋′ ⊇ 𝑋 and
`′ %\ `. Then, by the construction of %\ , `′ %\
𝑗
` for every 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘 . By consistency of %\
𝑗
,
we get 𝐶\ (𝑋′|`′) %\
𝑗
𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) for every 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘 . As a result, 𝐶\ (𝑋′|`′) %\ 𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) by
the construction of %\ . Therefore, %\ is also consistent with the choice function 𝐶\ . Since the
number of preorders is finite, this argument shows that there exists a unique minimal preorder
%\ that is consistent with 𝐶\ . 
Proof of Theorem 1
First, let us consider the first phase of the algorithm and check that `∗ %S 𝐶S (X|`∗). Since
𝐶S (X|`𝑘−1) = `𝑘 , by the irrelevance of rejected contracts, we get 𝐶S (`𝑘 |`𝑘−1) = `𝑘 for every
𝑘 ≥ 1. We show that `𝑘 %S `𝑘−1 for every 𝑘 ≥ 1. The proof is by mathematical induction on
𝑘 . For the base case when 𝑘 = 1, note that X ⊇ ∅ and consistency imply that
`1 = 𝐶
S (X|∅) %S 𝐶S (∅|∅) = ∅ = `0.
For the general case, `𝑘 %S `𝑘−1 and X ⊇ `𝑘 imply that (by consistency)
`𝑘+1 = 𝐶
S (X|`𝑘 ) %S 𝐶S (`𝑘 |`𝑘−1) = `𝑘 .
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Therefore, {`𝑘 }𝑘≥1 is a monotone sequence with respect to the preorder %S . Since the number
of contracts is finite, there exists 𝑛 and 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛 such that `𝑚+1 = `𝑛; we take the minimum 𝑚
satisfying this property and set `∗ = `𝑚. Then,
𝐶S (X|`𝑚) = `𝑚+1 = `𝑛 -S `𝑚
where the monotonicity comparison follows because -S is transitive.
It remains to show that the second phase converges and that the resulting matching is sta-
ble. It is easy to see that 𝑓 (X,∅, `∗,∅) v (X,∅, `∗,∅) because 𝐶S (X|`∗) -S `∗ by con-
struction and 𝐶B (∅|∅) = ∅ %B ∅ by reflexivity of %B . By Lemma 2, 𝑓 is monotone increas-
ing, so we can repeatedly apply it to 𝑓 (X,∅, `∗,∅) v (X,∅, `∗,∅) to get 𝑓 𝑘 (X,∅, `∗,∅) v
𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, `∗,∅) for every 𝑘 ≥ 1. We consider two separate possibilities. Suppose first that this
sequence converges. Therefore, there exists 𝑘 such that 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, `∗,∅) = 𝑓 𝑘 (X,∅, `∗,∅).
As a result, 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, `∗,∅) is a fixed point of 𝑓 . Let ( ?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑏, ˆ̀𝑠, ˆ̀𝑏) ≡ 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, `∗,∅).
By Lemma 3, ˆ̀𝑠 = ˆ̀𝑏 = ?̂?𝑠 ∩ ?̂?𝑏 and, by Theorem 7, ?̂?𝑠 ∩ ?̂?𝑏 is a stable matching.
Otherwise, if the sequence does not converge, there exists a subsequence 𝑓 𝑛 (X,∅, `∗,∅) w
𝑓 𝑛+1(X,∅, `∗,∅) w . . . w 𝑓 𝑚 (X,∅, `∗,∅) w 𝑓 𝑚+1(X,∅, `∗,∅) = 𝑓 𝑛 (X,∅, `∗,∅) because the
number of contracts is finite. By transitivity of the preorder w and the previous inequality, we
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1 . Similarly, we












1) is a fixed point of 𝑓 . This shows that the
sequence converges as in the previous paragraph, which is a contradiction. Therefore, there
exists a stable matching. 
Proof of Theorem 2
Since choice function 𝑐𝑖 has externalities, there exist 𝑋, `, `′ ⊆ X such that 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′) ≠ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`).
This implies, without loss of generality, that there exists a contract 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑖 such that 𝑥 ∈
𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`′−𝑖) and 𝑥 ∉ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖). We construct choice functions of agents other than 𝑖 satisfy-
ing the stated properties such that no stable matching exists.
40
The choice functions of agents on side −\ exhibit no externalities. Furthermore, each
agent chooses all the contracts in `−𝑖 ∪ `′−𝑖 ∪ 𝑋𝑖 that are associated with them whenever they
are available. No other contracts are chosen. The choice functions of agents on side \ other
than 𝑖 depend on whether the reference set has contract 𝑥 or not. When contract 𝑥 is in the
reference set, each agent chooses contracts in `−𝑖 associated with them. When contract 𝑥 is not
in the reference set, then each agent chooses contracts in `′−𝑖 associated with them. Otherwise,
no contracts are chosen.
We first check that the properties in the statement of this result are satisfied. The agents
on side −\ have choice functions that have no externalities. Furthermore, 𝐶−\ satisfies sub-
stitutability and the irrelevance of rejected contracts. Now, consider the minimum consistent
preorder %\\{𝑖} for 𝐶\\{𝑖}. Any reference set ` in the domain of %\\{𝑖} does not include contract
𝑥 because, for every agent 𝑗 ∈ \ \ {𝑖}, % 𝑗 is a preorder with a domain that is a subset of 2X𝑗 ,
so no matching in this domain includes contract 𝑥. Therefore, for any 𝑋 ⊆ X, 𝐶\\{𝑖} (𝑋 |`) is
the same for all ` in the domain of %\\{𝑖} because ` does not have contract 𝑥, implying that
monotone externalities is satisfied. Furthermore, by construction, standard substitutability and
the irrelevance of rejected contracts are also satisfied. Hence, 𝐶\\{𝑖} satisfies substitutability.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a stable matching 𝑌 . We consider two possi-
bilities:
Case 1: Consider the case when 𝑥 ∈ 𝑌 . If a contract in `−𝑖 is not in 𝑌 , then the agents
associated with the contract form a blocking pair. Thus, every contract in `−𝑖 must be signed,
so `−𝑖 ⊆ 𝑌−𝑖. Furthermore, 𝑌−𝑖 \ `−𝑖 cannot have a contract as 𝑌 would not be individually
rational for agents on side \. Therefore, `−𝑖 = 𝑌−𝑖. Likewise, there cannot be any contract in
𝑌𝑖 \𝑋𝑖 because of individual rationality for agents on side −\. This implies that 𝑌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑋𝑖. If there
exists a contract 𝑥′ ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) \𝑌𝑖, then agents associated with contract 𝑥′ block 𝑌 because
𝑥′ ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌𝑖∪{𝑥′}|`−𝑖) by standard substitutability. Therefore,𝑌𝑖 ⊇ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖). By the irrelevance
of rejected contracts, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌𝑖 |`−𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖), which is a contradiction since 𝑥 ∈ 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌𝑖 |`−𝑖)
by individual rationality of 𝑌 and 𝑥 ∉ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) by construction.
Case 2: Consider the case when 𝑥 ∉ 𝑌 . As in the previous case, it is easy to see that
𝑌−𝑖 = `′−𝑖. Likewise, 𝑌𝑖 ⊆ 𝑋𝑖. Since 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`′−𝑖) by construction, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑌𝑖 ∪ {𝑥}|`′−𝑖) by
standard substitutability. But this is a contradiction because 𝑥 ∉ 𝑌 implies that the agents
associated with contract 𝑥 form a blocking pair.
Therefore, there exists no stable matching. 
41
Proof of Theorem 4
Without loss of generality assume that \ = S. For any (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏) ∈ 2X ×2X ×2X ×2X we
have (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) w (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `𝑠, `𝑏). Therefore, (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) w 𝑓 (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅). By Lemma 2,
function 𝑓 is monotone increasing, so we can repeatedly apply it to the last inequality to get
𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) w 𝑓 𝑘 (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) for every 𝑘 ≥ 1. Since 2X × 2X × 2X × 2X is a finite set,
this sequence converges at some point as in the proof of Theorem 1, so there exists 𝑘 such
that 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) = 𝑓 𝑘 (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅). Therefore, 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) is a fixed point of 𝑓 . By
Lemma 3 there is
(
?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑏, ˆ̀, ˆ̀
)
that is equal to 𝑓 𝑘−1(X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅). Theorem 7 tells us that ˆ̀ is
a stable matching, which is the outcome of the seller-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm.
We next show that ˆ̀ is a seller-optimal and buyer-pessimal stable matching. Let ` be any
stable matching. By Theorem 7, there exist 𝐴𝑠 and 𝐴𝑏 such that (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) is a fixed point
of 𝑓 . Since (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) w (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) and 𝑓 is monotonic increasing, 𝑓 can be applied
repeatedly while preserving the order. Therefore, 𝑓 𝑘 (X,∅, ¯̀𝑠,∅) w 𝑓 𝑘 (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `) for every
𝑘 , which implies
(
?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑏, ˆ̀, ˆ̀
)
w (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `, `). Therefore, ˆ̀ %S ` and ˆ̀ -B `, so ˆ̀ is a
seller-optimal and buyer-pessimal stable matching. 
Proof of Theorem 5
We first show the necessity that when 𝐶\ satisfies substitutability, then, for each agent 𝑖 ∈ \,
there exists a list of preferences with the stated properties.
For any `−𝑖, we can construct a list of preferences as follows. Let 𝑥1 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖), 𝑥2 ∈
𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1}|`−𝑖), 𝑥3 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1, 𝑥2}|`−𝑖), . . . , 𝑥𝑘 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘−1}|`−𝑖), and 𝑐𝑖 (X \
{𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 }|`−𝑖) = ∅. This sequence creates an incomplete preference ranking over X𝑖 ∪ {∅}:
𝑥1 `−𝑖 . . . `−𝑖 𝑥𝑘 `−𝑖 ∅. Consider all such preference rankings (`−𝑖𝑗 ) 𝑗∈J . We need the
following:











Let 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖). We show that 𝑥 = 𝑥`−𝑖𝑗 for some 𝑗 ∈ J when 𝑋 is the set of contracts. If
𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖), then 𝑥 = 𝑥`−𝑖𝑗 for some 𝑗 . Suppose that 𝑥 ∉ 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖). If 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) ⊇ 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖),
then the irrelevance of rejected contracts would imply 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖), which is a con-
tradiction because 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) \𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖). Therefore, there exists 𝑥1 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X|`−𝑖) \𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖).
Standard substitutability implies that 𝑥1 ∉ 𝑋 . Consider preference rankings in J that have 𝑥1
as their maximal contract. If 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1}|`−𝑖), then we are done since 𝑥1 would be the
35For an analogue of this claim in the setting without externalities, see Chambers and Yenmez (2017).
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maximal element of 𝑋 with respect to a preference ranking since 𝑥1 ∉ 𝑋 and there would be
a preference ranking in J such that 𝑥1  𝑥  . . .. Suppose that 𝑥 ∉ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1}|`−𝑖). By the
irrelevance of rejected contracts, we cannot have 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) ⊇ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1}|`−𝑖). Therefore,
there exists 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1}|`−𝑖) \ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖). Standard substitutability implies that 𝑥2 ∉ 𝑋 .
Repeat this argument. Suppose, for contradiction, that 𝑥 ∉ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥 𝑗 }|`−𝑖) for all 𝑗 .
But there must exist some 𝑗∗ for which X \ {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥 𝑗∗} ⊆ 𝑋 . Then 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) and stan-
dard substitutability imply that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥 𝑗∗}|`−𝑖). This is a contradiction. There-
fore, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (X \ {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥 𝑗∗}|`−𝑖) for some 𝑗∗, which implies that 𝑥 = 𝑥`−𝑖𝑗 for some 𝑗 ∈ J
because {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥 𝑗∗} ∩ 𝑋 = ∅. Since 𝑥 ∈ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) implies 𝑥 = 𝑥`−𝑖𝑗 for some 𝑗 ∈ J , we get






Now let 𝑥 = 𝑥`−𝑖
𝑗
for some 𝑗 . This implies that for every 𝑦 `−𝑖
𝑗
𝑥, we have 𝑦 ∉ 𝑋 . By con-




















} = 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖), which concludes the proof of the claim.
Next we prove that, for any `′−𝑖 %
\ `−𝑖 %\ ∅ and 𝑗 ∈ J , 
`′−𝑖
𝑗
is a truncation of `−𝑖
𝑗
.
Take ` = ∅ and construct the list of preferences (∅
𝑗
) 𝑗∈J as above. For any `−𝑖 %\ ∅ and
𝑋 ⊆ X, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) ⊆ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |∅) by monotone externalities. Thus, for each 𝑗 , we can truncate the
preference ranking ∅
𝑗
to get a sequence as constructed above, call it `−𝑖
𝑗
.










(𝑋 ∪ {∅}) by construction.
Furthermore, for any `′−𝑖 %
\ `−𝑖 %\ ∅ and 𝑋 ⊆ X, 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`′−𝑖) ⊆ 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋 |`−𝑖) by monotone ex-













truncated at a weakly more-preferred contract than `−𝑖
𝑗
. Therefore, we get the conclusion that




is a truncation of `−𝑖
𝑗
.
Finally, we show the sufficiency that when there exists a list of preferences with the desired
properties, then 𝐶\ satisfies substitutability. Standard substitutability follows from the decom-
position result of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981). To show monotone externalities, suppose
that `′ %\ ` %\ ∅, we need 𝑅\ (𝑋 |`′) ⊇ 𝑅\ (𝑋 |`) for every 𝑋 ⊆ X. Equivalently, we need that
𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`′−𝑖) ⊇ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) for every 𝑖 ∈ \ and 𝑋 ⊆ X. By the definition of %\ , `′ %\ ` %\ ∅ im-
plies `′−𝑖 %
\ `−𝑖 %\ ∅ for every 𝑖 ∈ \. By construction, there exists a list of preference rankings
(`−𝑖
𝑗
) 𝑗∈J and (
`′−𝑖
𝑗
) 𝑗∈J such that for every 𝑗 ∈ J , 
`′−𝑖
𝑗
is a truncation of `−𝑖
𝑗
. Therefore,
𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`′−𝑖) ⊇ 𝑟𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`−𝑖) is satisfied. 
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Appendix E: Couple in Local Labor Market: An Extension
We can generalize the couples application in Section 3 so that there are externalities for both
partners in a couple. For each individual in a married couple the set of jobs are divided into
three sets. The first set has the most preferred “dream jobs.” The second set has less preferred
“decent jobs.” The last set has the least preferred “unacceptable jobs.” Dream jobs are always
more preferred than the outside option. Unacceptable jobs are always less preferred than the
outside option. Unlike these two sets of jobs, a decent job is sometimes more preferred than the
outside option and sometimes less preferred depending on the spouse’s job: when the spouse
has a decent job than all decent jobs are more preferred than the outside option, whereas when
the spouse has a dream job some of the decent jobs are less preferred than the outside option.
The pairwise ranking of jobs remains the same regardless of the spouse’s job.
In this more general version of the couples’ application, consider the following preorder
for married individuals. For each married worker 𝑖 there is a primitive ranking of jobs, which
can be based on the wages, and the outside option of being unemployed, say 𝑖. Then define
the preorder %𝑖 so that 𝑗 ′ %𝑖 𝑗 if 𝑗 ′ 𝑖 𝑗 , or 𝑗 ′ and 𝑗 are both decent jobs, or 𝑗 ′ and 𝑗 are both
outside options. In particular, all decent jobs are ranked as equivalent by %𝑖. The resulting
preorder is consistent because as there are more jobs available regardless of the reference sets,
every married individual 𝑖 gets a weakly more preferred job with respect to %𝑖. Substitutability
is satisfied because a married individual becomes weakly more selective whenever their spouse
gets a more preferred job, so they reject weakly more jobs conditional on `′ compared to `
whenever `′ %\ `. 
Appendix F: Additional Applications
In this section, we provide additional applications that satisfy substitutability. With the excep-
tion of our characterization result, which is Theorem 5, all our results work even when the
preorder for a side is not necessarily defined using preorders of agents on this side.36 Some of
the applications below allow for this generality.
Application 2. [Relative Rankings in Hiring] Agents on one side of the market represent
colleges and agents on the other side represent academics in a particular field. For each college
36See the previous version of our paper, which is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2475468.
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𝑖 and each academic 𝑗 the productivity of 𝑗 at 𝑖 is denoted by _(𝑖, 𝑗) ≥ 0. For simplicity, assume
that no two academics have the same productivity at a college.37
Suppose that each college 𝑖 hires at most two academics in the field considered, and that it
wants to hire at least one because of teaching needs and would like to hire a second academic
only if their productivity is weakly greater than a benchmark that depends on the productivity
of hires at other colleges. Formally, the choice function 𝑐𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 |`) of college 𝑖 is as follows:
from choice set 𝑋𝑖, the college chooses the academic 𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑖 with highest productivity _ (𝑖, 𝑗),
and it chooses a second academic 𝑗 ′ ∈ 𝑋𝑖 with second-highest productivity in 𝑋𝑖 if, and only if,
_(𝑖, 𝑗 ′) ≥ 𝑏𝑖 (`) where 𝑏𝑖 (`) is a benchmark productivity of academics at other colleges. We
assume that 𝑏𝑖 (`) is weakly increasing in max 𝑗∈`(𝑖′)_ (𝑖′, 𝑗) for all colleges 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖. For instance,
𝑏𝑖 (`) might equal the median productivity of the leading academic in other colleges, where 𝑗
is the leading academic in college 𝑖′ if 𝑗 = argmax 𝑗∈`(𝑖′)_ (𝑖′, 𝑗)). Or, 𝑏𝑖 (`) might be equal to
other percentiles of leading academics’ productivity distribution. The interpretation is that a
second academic is hired only if they are a “star” in the field.
College choice functions satisfy substitutability if we define the preorder %\ so that for each
college 𝑖, `′ %𝑖 ` if, and only if, max 𝑗∈`′(𝑖)_ (𝑖, 𝑗) is weakly greater than max 𝑗∈`(𝑖)_ (𝑖, 𝑗).38
This preorder is consistent with the choice functions: when more academics are available then
the maximum quality of the academics a college hires goes up (whether or not the benchmark
quality of academics increases). The substitutability condition is then satisfied: when more
academics are available and when the benchmark quality of academics increases, each college
continues to reject the academics it previously rejected. 
Application 3. [Dynamic Matching]39 Firms and workers arrive to a two-sided matching
market at times 𝑡 = 1, . . . ,𝑇 . Workers who arrive at time 𝑡 can wait and match at any time
𝑡, 𝑡+1, . . . ,𝑇 . At each time 𝑡 a unique firm 𝑓𝑡 arrives and either matches with one of the workers
that is available at this time, or leaves unmatched. Firm 𝑓𝑡’s ranking of workers is exogenously
fixed but this firm’s set of acceptable workers depends on the matches of firms 𝑓1, . . . , 𝑓𝑡−1: the
higher firm 𝑓1’s worker in 𝑓1’s ranking, the more selective firm 𝑓𝑡 becomes. If firm 𝑓1 hires
the same worker in two matchings, then the higher firm 𝑓2’s worker in 𝑓2’s ranking, the more
selective firm 𝑓𝑡 becomes, etc., lexicographically.
In this application, a consistent preorder for the firms is defined as follows: `′ %\ ` if,
and only if, for some firm 𝑓 we have `′ ( 𝑓 )  𝑓 ` ( 𝑓 ) and `′ ( 𝑓 ′) % 𝑓 ′ ` ( 𝑓 ′) for all firms 𝑓 ′
37For concreteness, we are using the academic job market in this application but this could be any job market.
38When ` (𝑖) is empty, we set the maximum equal to −∞.
39We would like to thank Maciej Kotowski for suggesting this application.
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matched before 𝑓 . This preorder is consistent with the choice functions, and the substitutability
condition is satisfied as choosing out of larger (in inclusion sense) choice set conditional on a
matching higher in this preorder, each firm continues to reject the worker it previously rejected.

Our theory applies to situations in which agents share profits, for instance because they
work for the same firm, or have some insurance arrangements, or benefit from a public good
financed by taxes on their private income. The following application illustrates a situation in
which there is profit sharing.
Application 4. [Profit Sharing] Agents on one side of the market represent attorneys
organized in law firms. Each attorney can work on up to 𝑘 ≥ 0 contracts with clients on
the other side of the market; an attorney works on all contracts they sign and the attorney
can also work on selected contracts signed by others in the same firm. Each contract allows
an arbitrary number of attorneys to contribute; the profit an attorney makes from a contract
does not depend on how many other attorneys contribute to it.40 Each attorney prioritizes the
contracts they work on, and the profit attorney 𝑖 earns on a contract depends on whether it is
the first, second, etc. contract in attorney 𝑖’s priorities. We assume that each attorney must
prioritize the contracts they sign over other contracts that they work on.
Attorneys choose what contracts to sign and what contracts to work on so as to maximize
their profits: An attorney’s profit is the sum of the profits from all the contracts they work on
whether they signed it or not. We denote by _ (𝑥, 𝑖, ℓ) ≥ 0 the profit that accrues to attorney 𝑖
from working on contract 𝑥 that they prioritize in position ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑘}. For simplicity, let us
also assume that there are no indifferences. This application satisfies our assumptions provided
_ (𝑥, 𝑖,1) > _ (𝑦, 𝑖, ℓ) for all contracts 𝑥 and 𝑦 as long as attorney 𝑖 is the signatory of contract 𝑥
and ℓ > 1.
Attorney choice functions satisfy substitutability if we define the preorder %\ so that `′ %\ `
if, and only if, max𝑥∈`′(𝑖) _ (𝑥, 𝑖,1) ≥ max𝑥∈`(𝑖) _ (𝑥, 𝑖,1) for all agents 𝑖 ∈ \.41 This preorder is
consistent with choice: When more contracts are available, the profitability of the best contract
signed by each attorney goes up (irrespective of what contracts other attorneys sign). The
substitutability condition holds for each attorney 𝑖: When more contracts are available and
when the profitability of the best contract signed by other attorneys (and hence the outside
option of attorney 𝑖) increases, the attorney continues to reject the contracts they previously
40This assumption and some of our other assumptions can be relaxed.
41We use the convention that the maximum over the empty set is −∞.
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rejected. 
Our theory also applies to situations in which agents choose basic products with no regard
to the choices of others but choose add-ons in a way that depends on others’ choices of basic
products. For instance, consider buyers who choose between Mac, PC, and Linux computers
(and operating systems) in a way that does not depend on other buyers’ choices and who
take the hardware/operating system choices of others into account when buying productivity
software.
Application 5. [Interoperability and Add-on Contracts] Suppose agents on one side
(buyers) sign two types of contracts with sellers on the other side: for instance, agents might
be signing primary contracts and add-on (or maintenance) contracts. These two classes of
contracts are disjoint.42 In line with the literature on add-on pricing, suppose that agents ignore
the add-on contracts when deciding which primary contracts to sign (Gabaix and Laibson,
2006), and suppose that each agent signs at most one primary contract and that there are no
externalities among primary contracts.43
We assume that no agent’s choice of add-on contracts depends on the other agents’ choices
of add-on contracts, and we allow a buyer’s choice among add-on contracts to depend on their
and the other agents’ choices of primary contracts in an arbitrary way as long as the buyer
rejects weakly more (in the inclusion sense) add-on contracts out of 𝑋 conditional on ` than
they would reject out of 𝑋′ conditional on `′ whenever 𝑋 ⊇ 𝑋′ and the agent prefers their
primary contracts in ` to those in `′.
Buyer choice functions satisfy substitutability for the preorder %\ such that `′ %\ ` when
each buyer prefers their primary contracts signed under `′ to those signed under `. This pre-
order is consistent: %\ depends only on primary contracts, and each agent prefers to choose
from larger choice sets over choosing from smaller choice sets. It is enough to check substi-
tutability separately for the primary contracts and the add-on contracts: it holds for the primary
contracts as the choice over them is not affected by externalities, and it holds for the add-on
contracts as we explicitly assumed it. 
42Similar applications can be written for hardware contracts and software contracts, or contracts on inputs and
outputs.
43Formally, we assume that each buyer’s choice among primary contracts does not depend on other agents’
matches nor on the availability of add-on contracts. One reason that the agents ignore add-on contracts when
signing primary contracts might be that the agents do not know which add-on contracts are available when signing
the primary contracts as in Ellison (2005). We can relax the assumption that each agent signs at most one primary
contract and assume instead that each agent’s choice among primary contracts satisfies the standard substitutes
assumption (see the next section).
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Appendix G: Comparative Statics
How do stable matchings change when agents’ choice functions stop (or begin) exhibiting ex-
ternalities? We answer this question controlling for the agents’ propensity to reject contracts.44
Definition 7. Choice function 𝐶\ is an expansion of choice function ?̂?\ if, for any `, 𝑋 ⊆ X,
𝐶\ (𝑋 |`) ⊇ ?̂?\ (𝑋 |`).
We then also say that ?̂?\ is a contraction of 𝐶\ .
In words, when choice function 𝐶\ is an expansion of choice function ?̂?\ , it admits weakly
more contracts (in the superset sense) than ?̂?\ for any set of available contracts and reference
set. Likewise, a contraction of a choice function selects weakly less contracts for any set of
contracts and reference set. A natural instance of contraction is when contracts are substi-
tutes under both ?̂?\ and 𝐶\ and contracts are closer substitutes under ?̂?\ than under 𝐶\: the
strength of substitutability among two contracts being measured by whether an agent is willing
to choose both of them or not. For instance, in relative ranking in hiring example in Appendix
F, when a college has larger 𝑘 , which is the share of other colleges it benchmarks itself against,
it becomes more reluctant to hire more than one academic making academics closer substitutes
for this college.
Controlling for the agents’ propensity to reject contracts allows us to establish unambigu-
ous comparative statics: removing externalities while contracting choice for one side of the
market benefits this side and harms the other side.
Theorem 8. (Comparative Statics) Suppose that the choice functions 𝐶B , 𝐶S , and 𝐶∗S satisfy
substitutability, 𝐶S does not exhibit externalities and it is a contraction of 𝐶∗S . Then, for any(
𝐶B ,𝐶∗S
)




-stable matching ` such that
` %S `∗ and `∗ %B `,
where %S is the Blair order for 𝐶S and %B is a consistent preorder for 𝐶B .
44The 2014-2019 drafts of our paper developed the comparative statics for both the case with and without exter-
nalities. We are now developing the no-externalities case as an independent paper and the marginal contribution
of the present discussion to extend the results to the case with externalities; we thank a referee for the sugges-
tion to split off the no-externality results. At the same time we developed our analysis, related issues (for the
no-externality case) were also studied by Echenique and Yenmez (2015) and Chambers and Yenmez (2017) who
introduced the terminology of choice function 𝐶 \ being an expansion of choice function ?̂? \ while we originally
used the terminology of 𝐶 \ exhibiting weaker substitutes than ?̂? \ ; cf. also Kamada and Kojima (2020).
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One application of this result is to the couples in local labor markets setting of Section 3, in
which there are externalities among members of a couple, while firms’ choices do not exhibit
externalities. Suppose that two workers get married. The marriage contracts the preferences of
the (post-marriage) secondary earner while not changing the preferences of the (post-marriage)
primary earner. Theorem 8—with workers playing the role of sellers of labor and firms playing
the role of buyers—then implies that for any for any matching `∗ that was stable before the
marriage there exists a matching ` that is stable post marriage such that ` %S `∗ and `∗ %B `.
This means in our context that all firms prefer the job matching before the marriage while all
primary earners prefer the job matching post marriage.
Proof of Theorem 8. Since %S is the Blair order for substitutable choice function 𝐶S—
which does not exhibit externalities—we have
𝐶S (𝑋 |`) %S 𝐶∗S (𝑋 |`)
for any `, 𝑋 ⊆ X.45 Because `∗ is a (𝐶B ,𝐶∗S)-stable matching, Theorem 7 gives us sets




-analogue of function 𝑓
from Lemma 2, defined as
𝑓
(




X\𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏), X\𝑅∗S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠), 𝐶∗S (𝐴𝑠 |`𝑠) , 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`𝑏)
)
.
The fixed point property, the contraction relation, and the above displayed property of %S imply
that
(𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗) v 𝑓 (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗),
where mapping 𝑓 and preorder v are defined in Lemma 2. Indeed,
𝐴𝑠 = X\𝑅B (𝐴𝑏 |`∗)
by the fixed point property;
𝐴𝑏 = X\𝑅∗S (𝐴𝑠 |`∗) ⊇ X\𝑅S (𝐴𝑠 |`∗)
45The argument below applies also to any 𝐶S with externalities as long as it admits a consistent preorder that
satisfies the displayed property. As with the substitutes comparison, we can further weaken this property by
imposing it only when 𝐶 \ (𝑋 |`) = `; the weaker assumptions suffice as in the proof we apply this property to 𝐶S
and ?̂?S only when 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`) = `.
49
by the fixed point property and the contraction relation between 𝐶S and 𝐶∗S ,
`∗ = 𝐶∗S (𝐴𝑠 |`∗) -S 𝐶S (𝐴𝑠 |`∗) (1)
by the fixed point property and the above displayed property of -S;
`∗ %B `∗ = 𝐶B (𝐴𝑏 |`∗) (2)
by the fixed point property.
By Lemma 2, 𝑓 is monotone increasing in preorder v and 𝑓 ℓ−1(𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗) v 𝑓 ℓ (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗)




the reference matchings of sellers and buyers (respec-
tively) in 𝑓 ℓ (𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗). Since the number of contracts is finite, there exists 𝑘 ≥ 1 such
that 𝑓 𝑘−1(𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑏, `∗, `∗) is a fixed point of 𝑓 as in the proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 3, there








Denoting this common reference matching by `, we infer from Theorem 7 that ` is a (𝐶B ,𝐶S)-





and `ℓ %B `ℓ−1; hence ` %S `∗ and `∗ %B `. 
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